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Essays in Competition and Externalities
Ilton Gurgel Soares
This dissertation consists of three papers. A common feature of these papers is the
interest in how externalities affect consumers and firms’ behavior. In the first paper, I study
one type of contractual externalities called exclusive dealing, whereby one firm cannot deal
with the competitors of the other. More specifically, I propose and estimate an empirical
structural model to investigate the effects on prices of upstream mergers in markets with
exclusive dealing contracts. The second paper is concerned with markets for a good with
network externalities, i.e. a good that generates higher utility the higher the number of
consumers purchasing it. The third paper studies externalities of investments on quality
improvement. When more than one firm is active, the product improvement externality
occurs because as firms chose different quality levels, competition is relaxed and consumers
get some consumer surplus from product variety. In the case of winner-take-all markets,
the business-stealing externality occurs because as one firm invests in quality upgrade, the
competitors become more likely to lose all customers.
The first chapter examines the incentives for price increase in upstream mergers when
the supplier has a network of exclusive dealers (ED).1 The incentives explored in this paper
come from changes in the threat point of the bargaining between the supplier and exclusive
retailers. The bargaining power of the exclusive dealer comes from local market power of
1An ED contract between two firms determines that one cannot deal with the competitors of the other.
These contracts are common in a variety of industries such as beer, fuel and automobiles. Franchising
relationships usually involve some type of ED agreement since the franchisee typically has to purchase at
least some of the goods or services exclusively from the franchisor.
the dealer or due to reputation aspects (when dealers know that the supplier behaves op-
portunistically after the ED contract is signed, they will be reluctant in becoming exclusive
of that supplier or renewing the contract). The change in the threat point post merger
is due to the larger network of exclusive retailers, which enables the merged supplier to
recapture a larger portion of the consumers that will be diverted from any specific exclusive
dealer in case of disagreement on the wholesale price negotiation. The empirical applica-
tion explored in this paper uses a unique and comprehensive dataset from the Brazilian fuel
industry, with information that includes retail and wholesale prices as well as quantities at
the station level. Aside from the good quality, this dataset is adequate for the intended
analysis because in Brazil fuel stations can either operate independently (in which case they
can purchase from any distributor) or sign an ED contract, when they can only purchase
from a specific distributor. Moreover, the data spam a period that includes an important
merger. I estimate the model using pre-merger data and simulate the effects of combining
the networks of exclusive dealers of the merging companies. The simulation shows that the
incentives for price increase are sizable, and the mechanism studied in the paper captures
a large fraction of the actual price increase observed in the data.
The second chapter, joint with Ilwoo Hwang, studies adoption and pricing when con-
sumers can delay their purchase of a good with network effects. In those cases, price alone
does not convey sufficient information for consumers to make their purchase decision and
they need to infer about current and future adoption in order to make their decisions. This
feature implies that some consumers might find optimal to delay their purchases in order
to make their decisions better informed about the success of the network. The multiplicity
of equilibria that is typical in the coordination game played by consumers implies that
the demand is not well defined for a given price, creating a problem for the firm’s pricing
decision. We consider a two-period model in which a monopolist sets prices and consumers
can delay their purchases to the second period when they will receive information about
early adoption. The dynamic coordination problem with endogenous delayed purchases is
modeled as a global game, for which we derive conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium.
The model is capable of exploring many issues in the economics of network effects such as
introductory pricing and early critical mass for platform survival. Our specification nests
the pure durables goods and herding models. Numerical results illustrate the amplitude
of possible outcomes in the dynamic model with delay. Substantial differences can arise in
terms of pricing, adoption and profits when we compare the full specification with multiple
benchmarks.
In the third chapter, joint with Michael Riordan, we develop a duopoly model of prod-
uct quality competition that focuses on how information structure determines equilibrium
outcomes. When we introduce private and correlated signals about the fundamental uncer-
tainty about quality differences, each firm can form a more educated guess about what the
opponent must be doing, which is the key for uniqueness of equilibria. Equilibrium prod-
uct improvement decisions are unique if and only if market uncertainty is sufficiently high
relative to strategic uncertainty, except in a non-generic special case. A unique equilibrium
takes the form of threshold strategies, whereby each firm improves its product upon receiv-
ing a sufficiently favorable signal of brand advantage. We show that the unique equilibrium
depends on the fundamentals as well as on investment costs and that the probability of
miscoordination vanishes as strategic uncertainty decreases. In the type of competition
studied here, firms have no incentive to choose the same quality as the competition arising
in the marketplace would bring prices to equalize marginal cost. Interestingly, this infor-
mation structure alleviates substantially the problem of miscoordination observed in the no
“information game” and also dominates the complete information game for a large range
of parameters in the model.
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Chapter 1
Mergers Under Exclusive Dealing:
An Empirical Analysis of the Fuel
Industry
Horizontal mergers (that is, mergers between competitors) frequently take place not
only among firms selling products directly to consumers, but also among firms in producer
markets. These mergers have the potential to affect competition not only in the upstream
(input) market, but in the downstream (retail) market as well. Standard merger analysis
focuses on the exploitation of market power in order to raise prices. However, many markets
are characterized by a vertical structure where upstream firms act as the only supplier of a
particular retailer1. Under these exclusive dealing (ED) contracts, input suppliers do not
1In the beer industry for instance, some brewers sign ED contracts with distributors, granting the
distributor exclusivity within a certain territory. See more about the beer industry in Asker (2004) and
Sass (2005). In the fuel industry, stations can either operate independently and be free to purchase fuel
from any distributor/refinery or they can sign an ED contract with a given distributor/refinery (e.g. Shell
or Texaco), carry the logo of the distributor in the station and commit to purchase only from that supplier.
For more on the fuel industry see Hastings (2004), Gilbert and Hastings (2005), Manuszak (2010) and
Houde (2012). In the automobile industry, car dealers can either operate as multi-brand (independent)
stores or under an ED with some specific manufacturer such as Volkswagen or GM for instance. See Nurski
and Verboven (2013) for more on ED in the automobile industry. Other examples of industries with ED
1
compete to sell to their exclusive retailers. In that case, analysis focusing on the input
market seems unlikely to predict any effect of horizontal mergers among upstream firms2.
In this paper I build and estimate a model to study how mergers between suppliers
in markets with ED contracts can affect wholesale and retail prices as well as consumer
welfare. Upstream mergers3 in markets with ED have an important difference relative to
other types of horizontal mergers: post-merger, not only will the merging firms form a single
entity, but the networks of exclusive dealers will also be combined. I show that, with the
combined network, the merged supplier is in a better position to negotiate higher wholesale
prices with its exclusive retailers, which will ultimately affect the prices paid by consumers.
The merged supplier can strike a better deal because, as a result of the consolidation of
the networks, it can absorb a larger part of the diverted sales in the case of a hypothetical
disagreement with an exclusive dealer. This creates incentives for the merged supplier to
increase wholesale prices in its exclusive network. However, the price increase depends on
the structure of the downstream competition and need not be uniform.
Figure 1 illustrates how ED between suppliers and retailers can create incentives for
price increase after a merger. Uj represents the suppliers (upstream firms) and ri the
retailers (downstream firms). ED contracts are represented by links between upstream
and downstream firms. Pre-merger, upstream firm U1 has an ED contract with retailer r1
and U2 has ED contracts with r2 and r3. The new firm resulting from the merger of U1
contracts include smartphones (Sinkinson, 2014) and video games (Lee, 2013). Heide, Dutta and Bergen
(1998) consider a sample of 147 manufacturers in industrial machinery, electronic and electric equipment
industries and point that over 40 percent of those had ED arrangements with distributors.
2To some extent, a similar logic was used by the Senior Vice President and Chief Diversity Officer of
Comcast, David L. Cohen, who pointed that the merger with Time Warner Cable “will not lead to any
reduction in competition or consumer choice in any market. Our companies serve separate and distinct
geographic areas. We don’t compete for customers anywhere.” The main difference between the Comcast-
TWC merger and the type of mergers that I study here is that I am interested in mergers between companies
that don’t serve directly the final consumer.
3In what follows I will use the terms “mergers between suppliers”, “merger in producer markets” and
“upstream mergers” interchangeably.
2
Figure 1.1: Hypothetical market with 5 retailers, 3 of which have exclusive dealing agree-
ments. Retailers r4 and r5 can either belong to other exclusivity networks or operate as
independent retailers, which are free to purchase from any supplier (some of which are not
included in this picture). Figure (a) considers the pre-merger case and Figure (b) depicts
the post-merger case, where the networks of exclusive retailers of suppliers U1 and U2 are
combined.
and U2 will have a network of exclusive dealers consisting of the combination of the two
networks. Pre-merger, in case of a hypothetical disagreement between U1 and r1, some
of r1’s customers are diverted to r1’s competitors. Therefore, from U1’s perspective all of
r1’s potential sales are lost. However, post-merger, in the case of the same hypothetical
disagreement, the merged supplier would still be able to capture the share of r1’s sales that
are diverted to r2 and r3, which now belong to U1’s consolidated network. When negotiating
wholesale prices, the merged upstream firm will take the value of the diverted sales into
consideration as an opportunity cost. Hence, the incentive for the merged supplier to raise
wholesale prices originates as a response to its ability (post-merger) to absorb a larger part
of the diverted sales of any member of the network in case of a disagreement. 4
4It is key to take ED into consideration in order to capture the incentives for price increase. Without
ED, each retailer is free to purchase from any supplier and wholesale prices are determined in a competitive
way. For concreteness, consider the case of fuel. When wholesale prices can be different for the various
independent retailers, they can be thought as being determined by a mechanism similar to a price quote or
3
My model combines three components to capture the strategic interactions involving
suppliers and retailers in a market characterized by ED. The first component describes the
vertical negotiations over wholesale prices between suppliers and exclusive dealers. Follow-
ing Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and the empirical literature on bargaining5, I assume that
wholesale prices are determined as a solution to the Nash bargaining problem conditional
on all other prices. The second component models retail price competition accounting
for the importance of geographic differentiation. The third component is the individual
consumer’s demand, which builds on Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) to estimate price
sensitivity and transportation costs for consumers. The demand model is tailored to the
application in the Brazilian fuel industry, which requires accounting for the consumption
of both gasoline and ethanol due to the popularity of flex fuel vehicles in that country. I
assume that consumers are located in the path defined by their commuting behavior as in
Houde (2012). Throughout the analysis, I take the network of exclusive dealers as given.
The difficulty in obtaining data on supply arrangements is perhaps the main reason
why the literature on ED is still remarkably limited. In this paper I construct a rich panel
data on the Brazilian fuel industry combining different sources. The data contains detailed
information about vertical transactions including retail and wholesale prices as well as
volumes at the station level. Additional information at the station level that I observe
includes location, brand affiliation, number of attendants and ancillary services.
In the estimation, I use data only from a period that precedes an actual merger between
two large suppliers, which combined had ED agreements with nearly 20% of the retailers
procurement auction. In that case, a merger between two distributors would reduce the number of bidders,
increasing the expected value of the wholesale price (winning bid). When the number of suppliers is large,
this effect can be negligible. In that case, the merger effects on wholesale prices will be driven basically by
the efficiency gains reduce wholesale prices. This logic illustrates that the ability of the suppliers to charge
prices considerably higher than marginal costs in this industry is a consequence of the ED contracts.
5E.g. Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Ho and Lee (2015), Crawford, Lee, Whinston and Yurukoglu
(2015).
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in the country. The estimation was conducted in the metropolitan area of Vitoria, which is
the capital of the state of Espirito Santo. This state was under suspicion by the antitrust
authority for being the one with the largest combined market shares per merger in the
country (around 27%).6 The estimated parameters and model are then used to simulate
the effects of the merger. The combination of the networks of exclusive dealers will induce a
new set of equations characterizing the equilibrium wholesale prices. These new wholesale
prices are then used in the equilibrium condition for the retail pricing to obtain predicted
consumers’ prices for both types of fuel. The simulated wholesale and retail prices are
the fixed points of this interaction between the equilibrium conditions from the retail pric-
ing and vertical negotiation. The data span the periods pre and post merger, providing
the opportunity to observe the realized prices at the time of the merger and conduct a
retrospective analysis.
I find that the bargaining weight of the major distributors varies between 0.52 and
0.60, significantly smaller than unity, which is the “take it or leave it” value. On average,
the model predicts a wholesale price increase of 4.8 cents per liter (cpl) for the merged
distributors and 1.3 cpl for the non-merged. These changes correspond to an increase of
30% in the margins of the merging distributors compared to the average margin pre merger.
At the retail level, the model predicts 4.3 cpl price increase for the exclusive stations of
the merged distributors and 2.7 cpl for the remaining exclusive stations. In addition, I find
that the average markup of the retailers is approximately 6%.
Since the data span a period which includes the merger studied, I am able to conduct
an ex-post evaluation of the model simulation. Actual data confirms the predicted increase
in the wholesale margins, as well as the difference in the wholesale price increase between
the merged and non merged firms. The observed increase in the wholesale margins was
6See page 6 of the Concentration Act for the merger (08012.001656/2010-01) available at
www.cade.gov.br.
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even larger than what was predicted in the simulation: the model predicts nearly 60% of
the actual average increase in the wholesale margins.
Strategic complementarity at the downstream level implies that the unbranded retailers
will eventually increase their retail prices in response to a price increase of the branded
retailers. While the model correctly captures this response for the unbranded stations, it
does not predict an increase of wholesale prices for independent retailers. The reason is that
independent retailers can purchase from any distributor and in that case wholesale prices
are determined in a competitive way, depending on the cost structure of the distributors
and not on the price charged by the independent retailer.
In terms of the demand estimates I find that the demand for fuel at any given station
is very elastic: average price elasticity of 20%. This value is higher than the one predicted
by Houde (2012) for the Canadian market (between 10% and 15%) and similar to what is
found in Manuszak (2010) using Hawaiian data. One additional reason why station-level
price elasticity in the Brazilian market is expected to be high is the coexistence of two
types of fuel that are substitutes for a sizable fraction of the consumers (flex fuel vehicle
owners).
Another relevant finding in the demand estimation was that consumers value brands.
On average, an unbranded (independent) station has to give a discount of approximately
1.5% in order to make consumers indifferent relative to purchasing the fuel in a branded
station. The money value estimated disutility of driving is twice as big as the average wage
in the country, suggesting that consumers tend not to deviate too much from their paths
for buying fuel.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 I introduce the data
and industry background. Section 3 presents the empirical model. In Section 4 I discuss
identification and estimation. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 the merger
analysis. Section 7 concludes.
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1.1 Related Literature and Contributions
This is the first empirical paper to study the effects of upstream mergers in markets with
ED. It builds on and contributes to three related literatures. The first is a small but growing
empirical literature on markets with ED agreements. The second is the large literature on
horizontal mergers7. The third is the literature on vertical and bilateral negotiations, more
specifically on structural models of bargaining.
The theoretical literature on ED was motivated in large part by the Chicago school
argument that in order for an ED agreement to be mutually beneficial it must be associated
to efficiency gains. Aghion and Bolton (1987) show that an incumbent supplier and a
retailer can exclude an efficient entrant if the contract includes liquidated damages. Chen
and Riordan (2007) show how a vertically integrated firm can use exclusive contracts to
exclude an equally or more efficient firm that is already in the market. Segal and Whinston
(2000) demonstrate that if the manufacturer offering ED contracts cannot discriminate
among retailers, both exclusionary and non-exclusionary equilibria exist. All retailers are
worse off, so exclusion will only succeed if retailers cannot coordinate their actions to
jointly refuse an exclusionary contract. Fumagalli and Motta (2006) show that when ED is
between suppliers and retailers instead of suppliers and final consumers, the coordination
problem may not occur. In that case, one single deviant retailer may be able to serve the
whole market by buying at a lower price from the entrant, enabling the entrant to cover
its fixed costs. Johnson (2014) presents a theory in which ED does not serve to exclude or
disadvantage rivals. Instead, ED gives each supplier the ability to internalize competition
amongst the retailers in the network. Relative to the case without ED, he shows that in
equilibrium retail prices increase, benefiting suppliers and retailers but harming consumers.
The papers in the theoretical literature that are more closely related to mine are Milliou
7See chapters 3 and 4 of Whinston (2006) for an excellent survey of the history and recent advances in
the horizontal merger and exclusive dealing literatures.
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and Petrakis (2007) and Fumagalli, Motta and Persson (2009). Milliou and Petrakis (2007)
study horizontal mergers in the upstream sectors with ED when bargaining is present.
Their model assumes Cournot competition at the downstream level and two part tariffs,
which leads to wholesale prices lower than marginal costs, and even more so post merger.
This generates a reduction on the retail prices following the merger, in the absence of any
efficiency gains. There are two important differences between my model and Milliou and
Petrakis (2007). First, I consider that the bargaining is only over the wholesale prices. The
second difference is that in my model downstream competition is assumed to be Bertrand
with differentiated products. Fumagalli, Motta and Persson (2009) consider the case of a
merger between an incumbent supplier and a potential entrant in a market with ED. They
show that the incumbent can use ED contracts to improve its bargaining position in the
merger negotiation with the entrant. Instead, in this paper I am interested in mergers
between two incumbent firms. I those cases, I show that and the improvement in the
bargaining position comes from the merger itself and with respect to the exclusive dealers.
The empirical literature on ED is remarkably limited, in large part due to the difficulty in
obtaining adequate data, specially on wholesale prices8. Moreover, the existing empirical
work on ED has primarily focused on foreclosure. For instance, Asker (2005) tests for
foreclosure due to exclusive dealing relationships in beer distribution and finds no significant
evidence that exclusive dealing increases market power. Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) find
that vertical mergers between cement and concrete producers were, on average, efficiency
enhancing, leading to lower intermediate and final good prices and larger quantities. Lee
(2013) measures the impact of ED on industry structure and welfare in the video game
industry and finds that ED favored the entrant platforms. In contrast, in this paper I focus
on how upstream mergers can create incentives for changes on prices under ED and how
8In order to circumvent this data limitation, empirical research modeling vertical negotiations has
relied on theoretical assumptions to infer wholesaler behavior (e.g. Villas-Boas (2007), Mortimer (2008),
Hellerstein (2008), Manuszak (2010)).
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this affects competitors, competition and consumers.
This paper is also related to a large literature on horizontal mergers, more specifically
to recent contributions on the predictions of merger effects, measurement of the effects of
actual mergers and mergers in producer markets. In large part, the literature on horizontal
mergers has considered one-tier industries. For instance, Nevo (2000), Pesendorfer (2003)
and Houde (2012) consider the case in which merging firms directly set consumer prices9.
To the best of my knowledge, the only empirical papers on mergers in producers’ markets
that explicitly consider downstream pricing are Villas-Boas (2007) and Manuszak (2010).
There are important differences between this paper and two just mentioned. First, I focus
on the case of upstream mergers under ED. Second, none these papers have information
about wholesale prices, which imposes some restrictions on the type of behavior that they
can allow the upstream firms to have. In practice, both papers assume that the upstream
firm charges a single price for all retailers. I observe wholesale prices and can take into
consideration the variation in prices and asymmetric incentives to raise prices within the
network of exclusive retailers. Finally, I observe prices both before and after the merger
which allow me to perform a retrospective analysis of the merger.
The literature on ex-post evaluation of merger simulation is very recent. The motiva-
tion for comparing predicted changes from merger simulation with observed prices are to
evaluate the accuracy of these forecasts, which can also serve as a test of the assumptions
imposed in the underlying model. Peters (2006) uses merger simulation to predict price
effects of five airline mergers from the 1980s and compares the predicted prices with ob-
served post-merger prices. Weinberg (2011) studies the effects of mergers on the prices
of the merged firms and competitors. Houde (2012) studies spatial competition with an
application to a real vertical merger, comparing diff-in-diff and counterfactual simulation
9The last Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued in 2010, do not address any special aspect related to
upstream mergers in markets with ED contracts.
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methods. Bjornerstedt and Verboven (2013) compare the predictions from a merger simu-
lation in the Swedish market for analgesics with the actual merger effects. One important
difference of what I do and the cited papers is that I account for the divisions between
downstream and upstream firms and the vertical negotiations between them. All the above
mentioned papers assume that the merging firms directly set consumers prices. Moreover,
none of those papers is related to ED.
The vertical Gross Upward Pricing Pressure (vGUPPI) proposed by Moresi and Salop
(2013) explains how a vertical merger can create unilateral incentives to raise prices. They
consider the case in which upstream firms are able to charge different prices from the down-
stream ones. The vGUPPI is very similar to the GUPPI proposed in the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, with the difference that horizontal diversion ratios between two competitors are
replaced by the diversion ratio from the upstream merging firm to the downstream merg-
ing partner. In my setup, a horizontal merger with ED has a vertical element because the
acquirer is also gaining an ED network from the merger. In this paper I show that the
incentives for price increase from mergers under ED also depend on the diversion ratios,
but only with respect to the new merged network of exclusive dealers.
Finally, related to the literature on structural bargaining models, this paper closely
follows Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Crawford, Lee, Whinston and Yurukoglu (2012)
and Ho and Lee (2015). The major difference with respect to these papers is that I am
interested on the case of a market with ED, which changes the structure of the bargaining.
Another closely related paper is Gowrisankaran, Nevo, Town (2014), which studies how
hospital mergers can affect vertical negotiations between hospitals and MCOs. The vertical
negotiations studied in that paper do not involve exclusivity. Another difference relative
to Gowrisankaran, Nevo, Town (2014) is that I account for downstream competition (as in
Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) and Ho and Lee (2015)).
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1.2 Industry Background and Data
Demand for gasoline and other fuels are an important component of households’ budget
and changes in their prices can have substantial effects on consumers’ welfare. In the U.S.
for example, gasoline spending occupies between 4.5% and 12.4% of households’ disposable
income (Houde, 2010). Based on data from the Personal Consumption Expenditures by
type of product from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Langer and McRae (2013) note
that gasoline is the largest non-durable item for most households. They also point to a
Gallup poll on June of 2008, a period of high gasoline prices, where one quarter of the U.S.
households reported that these prices were the single most important problem facing the
country.
Even though gasoline is a fairly homogeneous product, gasoline at the pump is a differ-
entiated product because of some aspects like location and ancillary services. An additional
reason why the fuel industry is not perfectly competitive is due to the dominance of major
oil companies, which represents a concern to antitrust authorities.
The fuel industry includes the processes of production, distribution and retailing. Gaso-
line is produced in the refineries and ethanol is produced in the distilleries. These products10
are then sent to the distributors, who are in charge of mixing fuels and additives as well as
storing, selling and transporting these to the jobbers and retailers. The retailer, which is
the only party authorized to sell to individual consumes, can operate under an ED contract
with one distributor or independently, when it is free to purchase fuel from any distributor.
Petrobras is the main Brazilian oil refinery, producing more than 90% of the total volume
of gasoline consumed in the country. Moreover, the refinery price of gasoline is insensitive
10Gasoline can be of types A and C. Gasoline A is pure gasoline, produced in the refineries, petro-
chemistries or imported. Gasoline C can be standard, with additive or premium. The gasoline C standard
is a mixture of gasoline type A and ethanol. This mixture is realized by the distributors. Gasoline C with
additive is a mixture of Gasoline C standard and additives. These additives contain detergents that help
cleaning the engine.
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to supply and demand because it is regulated by a public sector entity. All other prices are
freely determined in the market, including the the producer prices of ethanol, wholesale
price and retail prices.
Figure 1.2: Structure of the fuel industry.
Virtually every fuel station in Brazil sells both gasoline and ethanol. There are some
features that differentiate gasoline and ethanol and that might affect consumers’ choices.
First, the calorific value of ethanol is equivalent to around 0.7 of that for gasoline, which
implies that for a consumer indifferent between the two types of fuel there is a threshold
values of the ratio of prices that would lead to consume one or another. The second
difference is that a car running on ethanol is less hazardous to the environment. Third,
ethanol has a higher octane rating (110 vs 87-93 on gasoline). Finally, gasoline engine
demands less fuel, thus requiring less frequent refueling.
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Gasoline sold at the station is a mixture of anhydrous ethanol and gasoline in a propor-
tion that is defined by the regulator and varies between 15% and 25%. Both conventional
and flex-fuel cars can use this type of fuel, but the latter category, which has become the
dominating passenger car type, can use any blend ratio up to 100 percent hydrous ethanol.
The fuel taxes applied to gasoline and ethanol, are modified frequently to make the two
fuel types competitive.
The length of the contract between distributors and stations varies depending mostly
on the size of the financing, if any, that the station used for renovation or to enter the
market. The branded stations also get the support from the distributors in many items
such as help with the business plan and structure of the gas station, lease of equipment,
advertisements, training for the managers and employees, and marketing promotions (e.g.
car raffle). At the end of the exclusivity contract, the retailer is free to switch to a different
brand or become independent.
The relation between branded stations and distributors is similar to a franchising agree-
ment, which is potentially very different from vertical integration in terms of incentives.
An ED contract can, at least in theory, replicate the effect of vertical integration. In prac-
tice, because of limitations arising from transaction costs or legal issues, ED and vertical
integration are not equivalent. One example is the possibility of opportunistic behavior
that can arise in ED relationships. This is not a problem faced by stations when they are
vertically integrated with refineries or distributors.
Houde (2012) notes that between 52% and 72% of branded stations were company-
owned in 2001 in the Canadian market. Moreover, in the case of branded stations with
ED contracts in that country, wholesale prices are set at the station level in a weekly basis




The data used in this paper comes from several sources. The main piece of information
comes from a detailed survey conducted by the National Petroleum Agency (ANP), the
Brazilian regulatory agency of oil and natural gas. Every week since July of 2001, ANP
collects data on wholesale and retail prices for gasoline, ethanol and diesel at individual
fuel stations in over 500 municipalities in Brazil. In general, between 40% and 50% of the
fuel stations are surveyed each week. Coverage reaches 100% in the smaller municipalities.
In the larger cities, the survey adopts a rotating sample that eventually covers all stations.
The survey provides information about location of stations and distributors as well as brand
affiliation and shipping mode (CIF or FOB).
I combine the price data with information about storage capacity of the fuel tanks and
number of nozzles for each type of fuel in each station and monthly information about vol-
umes purchased from the distributor for the period between January of 2007 and December
of 2011, also provided by ANP. Additionally, I collected data on secondary activities of the
station such as existence of car wash, oil change and convenience store from the Department
of Federal Revenue of Brazil (Receita Federal). A summary of the main characteristics of
the stations is displayed in Table 1. Independent retailers are in general competing more
aggressively on prices and not so much in terms of additional services. In particular, the
number of attendants and nozzles, used to measure the service speed (time spent in the
station), is considerably lower in independent stations. Moreover, stations attached to
major distributors on average offer a larger variety of ancillary services than independent
retailers, with the sole exception of tire repair.
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mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
Number of attendants 9.49 5.34 6.13 6.02
Number of nozzles (gasoline) 5.22 1.69 3.47 2.04
Convenience store 0.26 0.41 0.14 0.39
Oil change 0.26 0.35 0.09 0.28
Car wash 0.28 0.38 0.15 0.22
Highway located 0.31 0.41 0.27 0.32
Tire repair 0.08 0.28 0.15 0.36
Major brands include include BR, Ipiranga, Shell and Esso.
Data on prices of ethanol at the producer (distillery) level were obtained from ESALQ.
These indices are reported weekly, consisting of information of average prices of hydrous
and anhydrous ethanol. Information on taxes on both types of fuel was obtained from ANP
and SINDICOM.
Figure 3 illustrates the monthly variation on the wholesale prices (FOB shipping11) in
the Vitoria Metropolitan Area in 2007. The original price data is at the weekly frequency.
For the purpose of estimation, I average both retail and wholesale prices at the monthly
level in order to have the same frequency as the volume data. Wholesale prices can vary
substantially within the same distributor for different exclusive retailers. This variation in
prices within the network is not a feature exclusively of the Brazilian market. In the U.S.,
11CIF and FOB are types of shipping agreements and differ in who assumes the expenses and respon-
sibility for the goods during transit. In the case of CIF (Cost, Insurance and Freight) - Insurance and
transportation are paid by the seller until the goods are received by the buyer. When shipping if FOB
(Free on board), the retailer is responsible for the transportation and all costs once the fuel is picked up
at the distributor.
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the refiner/distributor can also set different prices for stations within its own network. The
Brazilian market also allows price discrimination with respect to the unbranded stations.
However, when selling to unbranded stations, the U.S. refiners/distributors must post a
rack price that is the same for all purchasers at that rack12. In the Appendix A.1. I
provide the portion of an ED contract of a major distributor where it is specified that the
wholesale prices are “freely agreed between the parties”.
Figure 1.3: Variation of wholesale prices for exclusive retailers of some large distributors
and for unbranded retailers
Another source of information that I use is the Relação Anual de Informações Sociais
(RAIS), a matched employer-employee dataset assembled by the Brazilian Ministry of La-
bor. The data includes information on the occupation of the worker and I use it to obtain
the number of attendants in the stations. The data also includes start and end date on the
job, which gives precise information about employment at any point in time.
12See Hastings (2010) for more details on the U.S. market.
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Figure 1.4: Municipalities used in the estimation. The divisions within each municipality
are the weighting areas, the smallest level of aggregation available for household location
in the Census microdata.
The estimation in this paper is based on data from four municipalities in the state of
Espirito Santo: Vitoria (capital), Vila Velha, Cariacica and Serra (See Figure 4). These
municipalities are part of the Vitoria Metropolitan Area (VMA) and account for 46.2% of
the population in the state of Espirito Santo. The VMA has other three municipalities that
were not included in the estimation: Fundao, Viana and Guarapari. The first two because
they are not part of the weekly price survey conducted by ANP. The last one because it is
substantially different from the other municipalities in terms of consumption of fuel, since
this is mostly a vacation destination and fuel consumption is highly seasonal.
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I use Census microdata13 on consumers’ home and work locations, as well as commuting
time to construct flows within a metropolitan area. To characterize consumer locations, I
use the smallest level of aggregation available for household location, the Census weight-
ing area. Each weighting area requires a minimum number of households, contiguity and
homogeneity with respect to a certain set of population characteristics and infrastructure.
The Census microdata provides information about home location at the level of weighting
area. Work location is known only at the level of municipality. In order to construct com-
muting flows, I combine the information on home and work locations with the commuting
time (also included in the Census). The distances between population weighted centroids
of weighting areas and retailers were computed in terms of estimated driving time and
driving distance using Google maps.
The demand estimation requires a definition of the relevant geographic market for the
computation of market shares. This is a complicated task because isolated geographic mar-
kets are rare. In order to capture the possible inter relations among the four municipalities,
I computed the commuting flows of workers among the four municipalities, displayed in
Table 2.
Table 1.2: Commuting flows of workers for the four municipalities considered in the esti-
mation
Origin \ Destin. A B C D Total
A (Vitoria) 78.98% 4.42% 3.45% 13.16% 100%
B (Vila Velha) 34,22% 52,71% 6.13% 6.95% 100%
C (Cariacica) 26.95% 11.86% 50.67% 10.51% 100%
D (Serra) 29.34% 2.32% 1.74% 66.60% 100%
Source: Census microdata, 2010.
13I am thankful to Data Zoom, developed by the Department of Economics at PUC-Rio, for providing
codes for accessing IBGE microdata.
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The diagonal of Table 2 contains information about internal flows, i.e. people that
live and work in the same municipality. The off diagonal elements show a substantial
flow of workers commuting to a different municipality, remarkably to the capital (Vitoria).
For instance, more than 1/3 of the workers living in Vila Velha commute to Vitoria on a
daily basis. This is suggestive that stations in Vila Velha are competing with stations in
Vitoria, at least for those commuting consumers. Because of the intense flow among the
four municipalities, I define the relevant market to be the four municipalities in the Vitoria
metropolitan area.
Data on the monthly fleet of vehicles per municipality was obtained from Anfavea.
This data was combined with information on the registration of new vehicles by fuel type
in order to estimate the fraction of flex vehicles in each municipality. Flex fuel vehicles
became commercially available in Brazil in March of 2003, reaching more than 80% of the
registration of new vehicles after only three years and near 95% in 2013.
1.3 Empirical Model
Under ED, market power of the upstream firm depends on how it manages competition
among the retailers within its network as well as against other retailers. In order to quantify
the effects of a merger it is then important to understand how retailers determine price, how
consumers choose among the variety of options available and characterize the substitution
patterns among stations. The framework described in this Section accounts for these two
aspects by formally modeling the individual consumer’s demand and retail pricing. These
are the building blocks of the model for vertical negotiations between distributors and
exclusive retailers.
In an environment without contractual price commitment, I use a bargaining model to
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characterize how short run wholesale prices are formed in ED relationships. One concern
in business-to-business negotiations under ED is the fear of opportunistic behavior (holdup
problem), since the supplier can appropriate a large share of the retailer’s profits after the
exclusivity contract is signed (Williamson, 1985). Since this potential holdup problem can
discourage important ex-ante investments from taking place, the supplier might want to
commit to a lower bargaining power in the ex-post negotiation over wholesale prices (Grout,
1984). Hence, it becomes important to quantify the bargaining power of each party in those
relationships to understand eventual incentives for price increase following a merger14.
The timing of the model is as follows: in the first stage, exclusive retailers and distrib-
utors bargain bilaterally to decide wholesale prices, and retailers simultaneously set retail
prices for each type of fuel; in the second stage individual consumers choose which retailer
to purchase from and the type of fuel if the consumer has flex fuel vehicle.15 In the following
I provide a detailed description of each component of the model.
1.3.1 Demand
Demand for gasoline (g) and ethanol (e) comes from a population of consumers charac-
terized by a mixture of two groups: group 1 is composed by flex car owners and group 2
by gasoline car owners. The fraction of consumers in group 1 in market m is γm. Each
consumer i in group 1 can purchase either type of fuel from any of the r = 1, ..., J stations
or not at all. A market is considered to be a Census Metropolitan Area in a given month.
The size of market m is denoted by Mm and the total number of retailers in market m is
denoted by Jm.
14See Appendix A.1 for a copy of a contract from a major distributor where it is mentioned that “whole-
sale prices are freely determined at the time of the purchase through a consensual agreement between the
parties”.
15Any other transfer is considered to be determined by contract and is decided before the bargaining
takes place. In this paper I take the networks of exclusive dealers as given.
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Location plays an important role in terms of product differentiation in the retail fuel
market. The term d (li, Lr) corresponds to the driving time from consumer i to retailer
r. Following Houde (2012), the relevant distance considers the mobility of consumers in
the product space and defines the location of consumer i as the commuting route between
the home and work locations16. Given a pair of home and work locations, each consumer
is assumed to take the optimal route in terms of travel time. The relevant distance from
consumer i to retailer r is defined as the extra time that she takes to go to retailer r on
their commuting path:
d (li, Lr) = t (homei, Lr) + t (Lr, worki)− t (worki, homei) ,
where t (a, b) represents the optimal driving time from a to b.
The indirect utility of consumer i in group j purchasing fuel f from retailer r is
ujirf = δrf + λd (li, Lr) + τif + εirf
where δrf is the mean utility of fuel f at station r, i.e. a product pair rf . The mean utility
is assumed to be a linear function of observed station characteristics xrf , prices prf and
unobserved characteristics ξrf :
δrf = xrfβ + αprf + ξrf .
The individual deviation from the mean utility is modeled as a function of distances
16Another possibility is what is known as single-address approach, adopted by several papers in the
literature on retail competition (e.g. Davis (2006), Manuszak (2010), and Thomadsen (2005)). It considers
the following distance metric:
d (li, Lr) = t (homei, Lr) + t (Lr, homei) .
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and idiosyncratic taste for each type of fuel, λd (li, Lr) + τif plus an individual specific
unobserved utility εirf .
Figure 1.5: Single-address and multi-address distance metrics.
Taste parameter τif represents consumer i’s valuation of fuel type f . Since there is no
natural ordering between the two types of fuel, I set τie = 0 and assume τig ∼ N (µτ , σ2τ ),
with (µτ , σ
2
τ ) to be estimated. This structure is consistent with horizontal differentiation
between ethanol and gasoline.
The individual specific unobserved utility for each product (εirf ) is assumed to follow
a Type 1 Extreme distribution. This assumption implies that the conditional probability
that consumer i will buy from station r is
Pr|if =
exp (δrf + λd (li, Lr) + τif )
1 +
∑
k exp (δkf + λd (li, Lk) + τif )
.
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exp (δkf + λd (li, Lk) + τif )
)
.
The probability that consumer i from group 1 will choose ethanol is
Pie = Pr (τig + Iig ≤ Iie) = Φ
(
Iie − Iig − µτ
στ
)
and the probability that consumer i from group 1 will choose gasoline is Pig = 1− Pie.
Retailer r’s predicted market share of fuel f ∈ {e, g} considering only consumers be-














Omitting the subscripts for market, retailer r’s total market share of gasoline is the
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I assume that each of the J multiproduct retailers operates as a single firm17. Given brand
affiliation and the network of stations in the market, retailers simultaneously choose retail
prices for gasoline and ethanol given wholesale prices and other costs. Omitting the market















where ϕr represents the fraction of the gross margin that the retailer pays to the distributor
in the form of royalties (or franchise fee) when it has an ED agreement. The parameter ϕr
is set to zero if retailer r is independent18.
Assuming that a pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium exists, the necessary first
order condition can be rearranged to write equilibrium pricing as a function of wholesale
prices, retailer’s costs and mark-up:
pr = wr +
1
(1− ϕr)
cr −∆−1r sr (p) . (1.3.1)
where pr and wr are the vectors of retail and wholesale prices associated to retailer r, cr













17A coordinated behavior of the retailers can be easily accommodated in this model by assuming that
each retailer’s objective function is a weighted average of its own profit and the profit of its competitors.
18I don’t observe individual contracts and in the empirical application I set ϕr = 0.1, which corresponds
to the franchise fee charged by a major distributor in the market. This specific distributor does not
differentiate among exclusive dealers in terms of franchise fee.
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The FOC is used to simulate the new price equilibrium post merger. The approach
consists in finding a fixed point of (1.3.1). The other purpose of the FOC is to uncover cr,
expressing it as a function of observables and terms estimated in the demand model:
cr = pr −wr + ∆−1r sr (p) .
1.3.3 Vertical negotiations between distributors and exclusive re-
tailers
The network of exclusive retailers of distributor D is denoted by ND. Wholesale price paid
by exclusive retailer r ∈ ND to distributor D is determined by bilateral bargaining. In
reality, these negotiations can be interdependent in the sense that in case of a disagreement
between D and r, all wholesale and retail prices could potentially change. As in all papers in
the literature on structural bargaining19, I follow Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and condition
the solution of the bargaining problem on all other prices. Hence, in the hypothetical case
of a disagreement between retailer r and distributor D, all other retail and wholesale prices
will remain the same. This assumption is made for tractability only and in equilibrium
retail and wholesale prices will be optimal with respect to each other. Collard-Wexler et
al (2015) show that, under some conditions, this solution is the unique PBE with passive
beliefs of a specific simultaneous alternating offers game with multiple parties on both sides.
For all r ∈ ND, wholesale prices wrf ∈ w are negotiated simultaneously, with wrf being





)bD (Πr − drf)1−bD ∀r ∈ ND and f ∈ {e, g} (1.3.2)
19e.g. Draganska, Klapper and Villas-Boas (2010), Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Grennan (2013),
Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2014), Ho and Lee (2015), Crawford, Lee, Whinston and Yurukoglu
(2015).
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where ΠD and Πr represent the profits of the distributor and retailer, respectively. The
terms dDr,f and d
r
f represent distributor D and retailer r disagreement payoffs when nego-
tiating over the wholesale price of fuel f ∈ {e, g}. Parameter bD ∈ [0, 1] is the bargaining
weight associated to distributor D. Under this structure, each wholesale price wrf maxi-
mizes the product of distributor D and retailer rsurpluses from the negotiation taking as
given all other prices.












When retailer r ∈ ND and distributor D disagree on the wholesale price of fuel f , wrf ,















+ (wrfc − pprodfc − cDfc)Ms̃−r,fr,fc (p) ,
where s̃−r,f
k,f̃
(p) denotes the predicted market share of fuel f̃ in retailer k if retailer r is not
carrying fuelf in that period. Each type of fuel is assumed to be negotiated separately,
which means that if D and r disagree on wrf , nothing will change in terms of the price
purchased by retailer r of the other fuel, denoted by f c.














In the occurrence of disagreement on wrf , the retailer will not sell that type of fuel but will
20For the sake of tractability, I assume that the franchise fees don’t enter the profit of the distributor. This
can be the case for example when these revenues are completely utilized for the purpose of advertisement
or other efforts to promote the distributor’s brand.
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still be able to sell the other fuel, which implies on the following disagreement payoff:
drf =
(








The FOC of the maximization problem (1.3.2) in matrix form, stacking the two types





)(1− bD) (pprod + cD + Ω−1r SDr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
costs
+bD (p
r (1− ϕr)− cr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value added by retailer r
 (1.3.3)




























Price effects of an upstream merger The decomposition of wr tells that the equilib-
rium wholesale price is a linear combination of the distributor’s costs and the value added
by the retailer. The vector Dr contains the value of the diverted sales to retailers belonging
to network ND in case of a disagreement with retailer r and enters as an opportunity cost
for the distributor. This is the channel inducing a wholesale price increase following an
upstream merger: the combined network ÑD implies that the new vector D̃r will be larger
than Dr, with the difference proportional to the diversion values to the new retailers in
the network, k ∈ ÑD \ND. In equilibrium, retail prices of the stations in the network will
increase in response to the increase in wholesale prices. Strategic complementarity at the
downstream level implies that retail prices of the competing stations should also increase.
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From equation (1.3.3) again, this leads to an increase in the wholesale price of the other
distributors since the value added by their retailers will now be larger. The equilibrium
following a merger will be a fixed point of these interactions between retail and wholesale
price determination.
1.4 Identification and Estimation
1.4.1 Demand
The demand model is estimated using the nonlinear GMM method proposed by Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). The set of demand parameters is given by θ = {θ1, θ2},
where θ1 = {β, α} and θ2 = {µτ , στ , λ} are the vectors of linear and nonlinear parameters,
respectively. Linear parameters (β) associated to the mean utility are identified under the
assumption that the common characteristics are independent of ξrf . Identification of α
is more complicated because of the correlation between retail prices and ξrf . The reason
for this correlation is that consumers observe the quality index ξrf when choosing where
to purchase fuel, which implies that prices can adjust to variations in this term, which is
unobserved by the econometrician.
The unobserved product characteristics can be written as
ξrf = δrf (s,x,p, θ2)− xrfβ − αprf ,
where s is the vector of predicted market shares described in Section 4.1. The estimation
approach described by BLP is to first obtain δ as a solution to a fixed point problem and
then construct the vector ξ to be used in the GMM estimation21.
21The vector δ is obtained by finding the fixed point of the contraction problem












Since the structural error ξrf is correlated with retail prices, we need valid instrumental
variables. An instrumental variable should be (i) correlated with retail price and (ii) un-
correlated with the unobserved attributes of the station, ξrf . Retail price can be written as
the sum of costs and markup, suggesting that a valid instrument must be some exogenous
variable that impacts cost (i.e., a supply side instrument) or something exogenous that
impacts mark up (i.e., a demand side instrument).
A natural candidate for instrument is the wholesale price paid by the retailer, which is
correlated with the endogenous retail price. However, this variable can be problematic as
an IV in the current setup. The reason is that distributors might take into consideration
the specific demand drivers in the vertical negotiation, which implies that wholesale price
is not a valid instrument.
Instead, I use two cost shifting instruments. The first is the wholesale price of the closest
unbranded station22. While this variable must be be correlated with the cost of the exclusive
retailers, the assumption that wholesale prices for independent stations are determined in
a competitive way implies that it should not be correlated with the unobserved attributes
of the stations. The second cost based IV is the interaction of producer price (refinery and
distillery) with distance between the retailer and distributor. Both terms (producer’s price
and distance) must be correlated with retail prices through costs. Moreover, the interaction
is important to create enough variation at the cross section level.
The advantages of the contraction mapping are the guarantee of a unique fixed point and that this fixed
point will be reached for any initial value of δ. The main disadvantage is the slow convergence.The root
finding equivalent to the BLP contraction is











and is solved using Newton’s method. The potential problem with Newton’s method is that it is not
guaranteed to converge for any initial value. In order to provide “good” starting values, I run a few
interactions of the contraction mapping from BLP and then switch to the root finding problem. The fast
convergence of Newton’s method relies on user providing an analytical expression for the Jacobian. If finite
differences approximation to the Jacobian is used, Newton’s method is very slow to converge.
22When the retailer is unbranded, this IV is the wholesale price paid by the station.
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In addition to the cost based instruments mentioned above, I also use demand based
IVs. The list of demand side instruments includes the exogenous own characteristics as
well as average characteristics of the competitors within different distance radius. These
instruments are correlated with prices since proximity in characteristic space will impact
the stations’ markup. Finally, I also added the number of competitors within different
distance radius as additional demand based IVs.
For a given set of instruments Z, the vector of estimated demand parameters, θ̂ is
characterized by:
θ̂ = argminθ ξ (θ)
′ ZΦ−1Z ′ξ (θ) ,
where Φ is a consistent estimate of E
[




Taste parameters µτ and στ are associated to consumers’ valuation of each type of fuel
and ensure that the model is consistent with the horizontal differentiation between the two
types of fuel. Identification of these parameters comes mostly from the evolution on the
number of flex vehicles, which allows a larger fraction of consumers to decide between the
two over time. Identification of λ relies on the panel data dimension of the dataset as
discussed in Houde (2012). The argument is that λ can be identified if entry and location
choices are correlated with distribution of consumers and independent of ξrf .
1.4.2 Supply
The FOC for the retail pricing problem can be written as
cr = pr −wr + ∆−1r sr (p) ,
where pr and wr are observed in the data and the remaining term comes from the demand
estimation. Since all terms in the right hand side are either observed or estimated, we can
recover the marginal costs of the retailers using this equilibrium condition. I relate the
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uncovered marginal costs to some regressors as follows:
cr = Wrγ + κbr + γt + ηr. (1.4.1)
The vector Wr includes characteristics of retailer r such as number of attendants, num-
ber of pumps and ancillary services. The term κbr captures brand specific intercept and γt
is the time fixed effect. Equation (1.4.1) is estimated by OLS and the parameter represent-
ing the fraction of the gross margins that are used to pay the franchise fee is calibrated to
ϕr = 0.1 when the station has an ED contract with a major distributor and 0 otherwise.
This value is consistent with information obtained from industry sources.
I am not imposing the retail pricing equilibrium condition in the demand estimation.
The advantage of this approach is that the demand will be consistently estimated in the
case of misspecification in the supply side. The disadvantage is the lower precision of the
estimates when the assumption on retail competition is valid.
The FOC (1.3.3) is written stacking the two types of fuel negotiated with retailer r.
Since matrix Dr is a function of unobserved cD, we need to rewrite that expression for the
purpose of estimation. The equilibrium wholesale price can be written as the cost plus a
margin that is proportional to the distributor’s bargaining weight bD:
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where wD is the vector of wholesale prices to all retailers in the network of distributor D.






on the main diagonal and SD has market shares on the main diagonal and negative




in the off diagonal. Given the above expression
for the wholesale prices, I assume that the distributor’s marginal cost is a linear function
of explanatory variables h, cD = hΓ + η and estimate the following regression:
wD = pprod + hΓ +
bD
1− bD
B (p) + η.
The main difference between the equation (1.3.3) and (1.4.2) is that (1.4.2) includes all
stations pertaining to networkND, while (1.3.3) is a matrix representation of the conditions
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involving each individual station in the network. Endogeneity in this case comes from the
fact that B (p) is a function of equilibrium wholesale prices. The cost and bargaining
parameters are estimated by GMM under the assumption that E [η|Z] = 0, where Z is the
vector of instruments described in the demand estimation.
Identification of the bargaining weights and cost parameters Γ relies on two sources
of variations in negotiated wholesale prices between distributors and exclusive retailers:
the within network variation and the variation across distributors. The derivation of the
bargaining regression uses pr−wr− 1
(1−ϕr)c
r = −∆−1r sr (p) from the equilibrium condition
in the retail pricing. Hence, B (p) is determined from the substitution patterns obtained in
the demand model and the assumption on retail pricing. This implies that identification of
the bargaining weights relies on information from marginal costs of the exclusive retailers
and hence is conditional on the assumption about retail price competition and consistency
of the demand estimation.
The franchise fee does not create a problem for the identification of the bargaining
weights because, given ϕr and the retail pricing model, the value of the franchise fee is
determined solely by wholesale prices. This is important because the bargaining weights
cannot be identified if the bargaining impacts fixed transfers. I assume that all fixed
transfers are negotiated at the time when the exclusivity contract is signed, which happens
before the bargaining on wholesale price takes place.
As pointed in Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015), it is empirically difficult to iden-
tify bargaining weights and cost shifters at the same level. For this reason, I also do





Table 3 presents the parameter estimates of the demand model. The model is estimated
using monthly data over the period from January of 2007 to April of 2011, which is the
month preceding the merger studied in the next Section.
The price coefficient is precisely estimated and indicates that consumers are highly price
sensitive. To have an idea of the magnitude of this estimate, it implies an average price
elasticity at the station level of -20.4. This estimate is of the same order of magnitude of
studies in other markets such as Houde (2012), which considers the Canadian market and
finds price elasticity of demand as high as -15 and Manuszak (2010), which finds for the
Hawaiian market elasticities as high as -25.7. Price elasticity in the Brazilian market tends
to be higher due to the possibility of freely substituting between ethanol and gasoline for
the consumers who own flex vehicles.
The coefficient of the dummy variable for unbranded stations is also precisely estimated.
The negative sign implies that consumers are willing to pay extra when purchasing from
branded stations. The estimated value implies that, on average, an unbranded station
has to give a discount of around 1.5% in order to make consumers indifferent relative
to purchasing from a branded station, controlling for all other characteristics. Consumer
surveys indicate that consumers normally associate branded stations to higher credibility
or higher quality, which is not necessarily true since any brand of fuel of a given octane
rating will run an automobile in the same way.23 Hosken, McMillan and Taylor (2008) find
that the only station characteristic that is a good predictor of the retail price heterogeneity
is the station’s brand affiliation.
23Relatedly, Bronnenberg, Dube, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2015) discuss the brand premium for health
products and suggest that a sizable share of it can be explained by misinformation and consumer mistakes.
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Table 1.3: Demand Estimates





Convenience store 0.092*** 0.005
Car wash 0.107*** 0.006
Oil change 0.103*** 0.010
Highway -0.327*** 0.018
Tire repair -0.421*** 0.007
Highway x tire repair 0.854*** 0.054
Nonlinear parameters Estimates Std. Err.
µτ (avg. taste for gasoline) 0.92*** 0.31
στ (variation in taste) 8.82*** 3.41




First stage F-statistic 23.07
Average own-price elasticity -20.38
*** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level.
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The estimates of the linear parameters also indicate that consumers value having more
attendants and many fueling positions (more nozzles) in the station, both of which are
associated to less time spent to refuel. Moreover, convenience store, car wash and oil
change significantly increase demand. The negative estimate for availability of tire repair
is perhaps capturing the fact that some stations that offer this service are older and not
well maintained. The negative coefficient on highway dummy variable suggests that the
average consumer dislikes stopping at a highway station, which implies that those stations
need to offer a lower price relative to the stations located in the city in order to attract the
average consumer. The interaction of highway location and tire repair produces a positive
coefficient with a magnitude higher than the sum of both coefficients on each variable
separately, indicating that tire repair service significantly increases demand in stations
located in highways.
Turning to the nonlinear parameters, the distance coefficient is sizable and precisely
estimated. Considering a purchase of 25 liters, the estimated cost of driving an hour is
R$17.58 (= λ̂
α̂
). This value is twice as big as the average industry wage in the country,
which in 2010 was estimated24 to be R$ 9,48. This result suggests that consumers tend not
to deviate too much from their paths for purchasing fuel.
The remaining two nonlinear parameters characterize the individuals’ tastes for each
fuel. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level, but not as precisely estimated as the
distance coefficient. The positive sign of estimated µτ implies that the average consumer
has a preference for gasoline compared to ethanol. To get a sense of how large the preference
for gasoline is, when prices are equal to the ratio of calorific power25, 0.7, the consumption
of gasoline by the owners of flex fuel vehicles is estimated to be nearly 10% bigger than
that of ethanol. The estimates indicate substantial variation in taste, captured by the
24From www.bls.gov/data.
25One liter of ethanol corresponds to approximately 0.7 liters of gasoline in terms of calorific power.
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high value of στ . This result is in line with the findings from Salvo and Huse (2011) and
Anderson (2010), who document preference heterogeneity for each type of fuel, with a
significant share of flex drivers choosing the most expensive fuel even when ethanol and
gasoline energy equivalent prices differ by 20%.
1.5.2 Retail Pricing
Table 4 displays the estimates of the retailers’ marginal costs from the retail pricing model.
The coefficients are estimated by OLS with time and municipality fixed effects. The high
price elasticity of the demand discussed in the last section implies that the market power
of retailers is limited. The average gross margin (p
r−wr
wr
) of the retailers is 12.4% and the




The number of attendants in the station is a measure of quality since it can proxy
for the time spent in the station. The estimated coefficient on the number of attendants
implies that the cost per liter of an attendant is 1.2 cents. Considering a station that sells
150k liters per month, this estimate implies a monthly cost of $1,800, a value compatible
with the costs of an attendant during the period studied, including taxes and salary paid
by the station.
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Table 1.4: Estimates of the marginal costs of retailers
Dep. Variable: Estimated Marginal Cost (in cents)
Explanatory variable Estimates Std. Err.
Independent retailer 2.779*** 0.180
Number of attendants 1.236*** 0.144
Storage capacity -1.024* 0.603
Number of nozzles 0.857** 0.398
Convenience store 1.110*** 0.155
Oil change 1.047*** 0.166
Car wash -0.531*** 0.152




Average gross margin 12.4%
Average markup 5.9%
*** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. The average gross margin is defined
by (p
r−wr
wr ) and the estimated average markup by (
pr−cr−wr
wr ).
Estimated marginal costs of independent retailers are on average larger than those of
exclusive retailers. This can be related to the fact that exclusive retailers receive support
from their distributors on things such as business plan and structure of the station as well
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as training for the managers and employees. Most of the remaining station characteristics
are estimated to affect the marginal cost function of stations as expected. Larger stations
(proxied by storage capacity) have on average lower marginal costs, but the estimated
coefficient is significant only at the level of 10%. Stations located on a highway also have
significantly lower marginal cost26. One interpretation for the negative coefficient of car
wash is that this service is complementary to fuel sales, then reducing the effective cost of
serving an additional consumer27.
1.5.3 Bargaining
The estimates of the bargaining model using pre-merger data are presented in Table 5.
Gowrisankaran, Nevo and Town (2015) argue that it is empirically difficult to identify
bargaining weights and cost shifters at the same level. For this reason I follow their approach
and estimate two specifications. The specification in column (a) allows the bargaining
parameters to vary across distributors. In that case, I do not include the distributors’ fixed
effects. The specification in column (b) assumes equal bargaining weights for distributors
and retailers, i.e., bD = 0.5 for every D.
26There is a possible interference on the estimates of the coefficients of highway located and size because
highway stations tend to be larger. The signs are preserved when I estimate the model with only highway
dummy or storage capacity.
27This interpretation is analogous to the one provided by Houde (2012), who finds a similar result for
car wash and convenience store and suggests that gasoline is a loss-leader product.
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Table 1.5: Estimates of the bargaining model
(a) (b)
Bargaining weight estimates Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
bBR 0.52*** 0.09 0.5 -
bEsso,Shell 0.59*** 0.11 0.5 -
bIpiranga 0.60*** 0.11 0.5 -
Marginal cost estimates (cents) Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
Distance (km) 0.023* 0.012 0.025* 0.0136
Lag producer’s price 0.027*** 0.01 0.019** 0.009
BR - - -0.025*** 0.001
Esso/Shell - - 0.018*** 0.001
Ipiranga - - 0.007** 0.003
Time FE Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes
number of observations 8766 8766
*** denotes significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. In specification (a) I estimate the
bargaining weights but do not include the distributors’ fixed effects. In (b) I set the bargaining weights at
0.5 and include the distributors’ fixed effects in the specification of marginal costs.
I find that the bargaining weights of the major distributors varies between 0.52 and 0.60,
significantly smaller than unity, which is the “take it or leave it” value. The bargaining
weights (specification (a)) and distributors’ fixed effects (specification (b)) of the merging
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firms (Esso and Shell) are estimated together.28 Bargaining weight varies across distribu-
tors, but not in a significant way. Moreover, none of the estimated bargaining weights is
statistically different from 0.5. In the merger simulation I use the specification (b), which
includes the distributors fixed effects in the equation for the marginal cost and assumes
that bargaining weights of distributors and stations are the same.
The distance term in the marginal cost specification is included to capture both the
transportation costs as well as any other managerial costs that vary with distance (e.g.
monitoring the quality of the fuel and service provided by the station). According to
industry sources, the shipping costs are flat up to a distance of around 250 km. Since
the maximum distance to a distributor from stations within the Vitoria metropolitan area
is approximately 145 km, the shipping costs are basically captured by the constant term.
The lag of producer’s price captures the cost of carrying stocks into the next period. It is
precisely estimated and the magnitude of the estimated coefficient means that the cost of
carrying stock to the next period is around 1.9% of the producers’ price.
The distributors’ fixed effects capture the average cost deviation with respect to the
base group, which is the collection of all distributors other than Petrobras, Ipiranga, Esso
and Shell and that have exclusive retailers. Among the major distributors, only Petrobras
has estimated marginal cost lower than those in the base group.
1.6 Analysis of an Upstream Merger
In this Section, I present the results of the merger simulation and ex-post evaluation of the
model predictions. I start with a short description of the merger studied. Next, I provide
the details of the simulation methodology employed in the analysis, followed by the results,
28I also estimated the model allowing for different values of the bargaining weight for Esso and Shell,
but they were not statistically different from each other. Making then distinct would create a problem for
the merger simulation in terms of which value to use.
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where I confront the predictions with the observed prices and shares following the merger.
1.6.1 Brief History of the Merger
Although there are around 200 fuel distributors in the country, the Brazilian distribution
sector is very concentrated. As of 2010, the four largest distributors had a joint share of
67.2% in the gasoline market (BR (29.7%), Ipiranga (19.6%), Shell (11.2%) and Esso/Cosan
(6.7%%))29. The proposed merger between Shell and Esso/Cosan raised a concern in the
antitrust authority because of the high participation of the merging firms in some regions.
The state of Espirito Santo was the one where Shell and Esso had higher participation,
with 27% market share and around 25% of the stations being exclusive of either one of
these distributors. After the merger, the exclusive retailers of the merged firm carrying the
Esso brand were given the limit of three years to change to the Shell logo.
The exact date at which the two distributors started to operate jointly is not publicly
known. The new company (named Raizen) announced that the joint operation should
start by the end of the first semester of 2011. Based on ANP data on brand affiliation,
the changes to Raizen were observed in the second half of May of 2011 (more precisely, on
May/18). I assume that May/2011 was the month when the merged distributors started
the joint operation. The vertical line in Figure 6 indicates the merger period. In that
month, there was a jump in the average margins of the distributors, both the merging and
non merging ones.
29Source: Anuario Estatistico ANP, 2011.
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for the merged firms (orange squares) and non merged firms (blue circles). The vertical
line indicates the period of the merger. Data from Vitoria Metropolitan Area (VMA).
1.6.2 Merger Simulation Analysis
To simulate the post merger equilibrium, I combine the networks of exclusive retailers of













ppost,r (1− ϕr)− (Wrγ̂ + κ̂br + γ̂t)
)]
,
where hΓ̂ and Wrγ̂ + κ̂br + γ̂t represent the estimated costs of the distributor and retailer,
respectively. Vector D̃r contains the diversion values considering the combined network.
The predicted post-merger retail price (ppost,r) is obtained as the solution to the fixed
point problem below:












which depends on the demand model through ∆−1r (p
post) and sr (p
post).
Each component of the model has a clear role in the simulation of the wholesale and
retail prices following a merger: (i) the demand is used to predict shares and price sen-
sitivity; (ii) retail pricing is used to predict retailers’ costs; and (iii) bargaining model is
used to predict distributors’ costs. To get wpost and ppost we iterate the bargaining, retail
pricing and demand until convergence.
In the analysis that follows I am considering that the bargaining weights of the distrib-
utors and retailers are the same (i.e., bD = 0.5). If the bargaining weights of the distributor
increase as a result of the merger, it will get a larger share of the total profits, which will
likely induce investments in cost savings.
In order to predict the effects of the merger we need to characterize the prices asso-
ciated to independent retailers, which in the Vitoria Metropolitan Area corresponds to
nearly 15% of the stations at the time of the merger. Independent retailer j is assumed to
procure upstream from a set of Nj distributors, which compete in a reverse auction with
no reserve price to serve retailer j. Each local distributor privately observes its own costs
and all distributors are assumed to be risk neutral and behave non cooperatively. The cost
considered in the bidding function does not include producer’s price and is assumed to be
independent across distributors. There are many variations of possible representations of
this procurement auction. In the merger simulation I make the simplifying assumption
that the wholesale price that each independent retailer is paying varies only to the extent
of the variation in the producer’s prices. This is equivalent to saying that the realizations
of the private costs in the period of the merger are identical to those pre merger.
1.6.3 Results
Table 6 reports the simulated post-merger equilibrium gasoline prices for the Vitoria
Metropolitan Area. The results assume zero efficiency gains from the merger.
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Table 1.6: Merger simulation and observed data
1: No merger (simulation)
Esso/Shell other
Average wholesale price 2.591 2.587
Average wholesale gross margin 9.80% 9.63%
Average retail price 2.926 2.919
2: Merger (simulation)
Esso/Shell other
Average wholesale price 2.639 2.601
∆ wholesale prices (relative to the no merger simulation) 4.8 cpl (1.8%) 1.3 cpl (0.6%)
Average wholesale gross margin 11.84% 10.23%
Average retail price 2.969 2.946
∆ retail prices (relative to the no merger simulation) 4.3 cpl (1.5%) 2.7 cpl (0.9%)
3: Observed data
Esso/Shell other
Average wholesale price 2.672 2.642
Average wholesale gross margin 13.25% 12.22%
Average retail price 3.017 3.011
Note: Variation in retail and wholesale gasoline prices are measured in cents per liter (cpl). Average






On average, the model predicts a wholesale price increase of 4.8 cents per liter (cpl)
for the merged distributors and 1.3 cpl for the non-merged. These changes correspond to
an increase of 30% in the margins of the merging distributors compared to the average
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margin pre merger. At the retail level, the model predicts 4.3 cpl price increase for the
exclusive stations of the merged distributors and 2.7 cpl for the remaining exclusive stations.
This implies that exclusive retailers of the merging distributors are only partially passing-
through the increase in the wholesale prices to retail prices. The average increase in the
retail prices of the stations in the competing networks is higher than the increase in their
wholesale prices. One possible explanation for this is that part of the price increase comes
from the higher wholesale price, but another part comes from the strategic complementarity
at the retail level, which incentivizes stations to increase retail prices after a price increase
of the competitors.
Since the data span the post merger period, I am able to conduct an ex-post evaluation
of the model simulation. The analysis presented here is focusing on the short run effects
on prices. Figure 7 displays the simulated wholesale margins in the counterfactual case of
no merger. The red diamond represents the distributors associated to the proposed merger
and the blue diamond represents the remaining distributors. The simulated margins in the
absence of merger do not exhibit any significant difference among the distributors.
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Figure 1.7: Observed and simulated wholesale prices post merger. Data from Vitoria
Metropolitan Area (VMA).
The consolidation of exclusive dealing networks following the merger creates incentives
for the merged supplier to increase wholesale prices, as we can observe in Figure 8. Impor-
tantly, the observed data confirms the model prediction that the increase in the margin of
the merging distributors is larger than that of the other distributors. The observed whole-
sale price increase is of a similar order of magnitude, but larger than what is predicted by
the model. The model can capture around 60% of the increase in the wholesale margins of
the merging distributors, suggesting that other forces might have played an important role
at the time of the merger.30
30The model also predicts that the price increase will not be uniform. However, the observed variation
in the wholesale price for the region studied at the time of the merger was substantially lower than what
was observed pre merger and than what was predicted by the model. I am currently estimating the model
and merger simulation for another region that did not exhibit the same pattern in terms of reduction in
the wholesale price variability.
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Figure 1.8: Observed and simulated wholesale prices post merger. Data from Vitoria
Metropolitan Area (VMA).
Strategic complementarity at the downstream level implies that the unbranded retailers
will eventually increase their retail prices in response to a price increase of the branded
retailers. While the model correctly captures this response from the unbranded stations,
it does not predict an increase of wholesale prices for independent retailers. The reason
is that independent retailers can purchase from any distributor and in that case wholesale
prices are assumed to be determined in a competitive way, depending on the cost structure
of the distributors and not on the price charged by the independent retailer.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studies upstream mergers in markets with ED contracts, where by ED I mean
a contract between two firms in which one is prohibited from dealing with the competitors
of the other. Under this type of arrangement, since the supplier is a monopolist with
respect to the exclusive retailer, a merger between suppliers focusing on the input market
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has no clear effect on prices. The main result of the paper is to show that mergers under
ED can produce sizable incentives for price increase. The network structure of exclusive
retailers affects the bargaining position of distributors, creating a channel for wholesale
price increase after a merger, with magnitude proportional to the diversion ratios within
the network.
The assumption of simultaneous determination of wholesale and retail prices is used in
this paper and in the literature on structural models of bargaining for tractability. I am
currently working on relaxing this assumption, by allowing wholesale and retail prices to
be determined sequentially. In order to do that, we need to understand how changes in the
wholesale prices affect retail prices, which involves the computation of passthrough.
Although this paper provides an important step in understanding the vertical relations
between suppliers and exclusive dealers, one limitation of the approach is that networks of
exclusive retailers are taken as given. This assumption can be important when wholesale
pricing influences the decision of retailers to become exclusive or to renew an existing
exclusivity contract. In a related paper, I am extending the model to endogenize the
network of exclusivity which will allow to access the incentives of retailers and distributors
after a merger. This is important because antitrust authorities might want to consider the
long run effects of a merger, including the incentives to become exclusive as well as which
other mergers would be induced by the proposed merger.
The fuel industry is perhaps an extreme case because of product homogeneity. However,
the key feature discussed in this paper is how the combination of the networks of exclusive
dealers post merger can affect the incentives of the upstream firm to raise prices. Hence,
the mechanism discussed here does not rely on the homogeneity of the goods sold. To
a large extent, mergers in other industries where ED is common such as soft beverages,
beer and automobiles would have similar incentives for price increase in the short run. In
some cases, a long period is needed to realize the efficiencies from the merger as pointed in
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Focarelli and Panetta (2003). Moreover, in the long run, since products in these industries
can be highly differentiated, other aspects must be taken into consideration because of
the possibility of changing product variety following a merger. Further study is needed to
quantify the effects of upstream mergers in such contexts.
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Chapter 2
Delayed Purchases in Markets with
Network Effects
Consumers can find beneficial to delay their purchases when faced with uncertainty
about quality or the adoption decisions by other consumers as well as in situations in
which prices are decreasing over time. When quality is unknown at the time of the purchase
decision, delay can be motivated by information acquisition in future periods. In the case
of goods with network effects, consumer’s valuation of a good is increasing in the number
of other consumers buying the same good. This implies that prices alone do not convey
sufficient information for consumers to make their decisions and, before doing that, they
need to infer about the number of other consumers that are joining the network. Delaying
purchases in this case will allow consumers to gain information about the popularity of the
network and reduce ex-post regret. Finally, in the case of pure durable goods, the trade-off
faced by consumers is basically early consumption versus lower future price.
In each of the cases described above, the strategic behavior of consumers can make the
optimal decisions of the firm fairly complicated. Equilibrium analysis of consumer behavior
in network markets is typically problematic because of the multiplicity of equilibria related
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to the coordination game played by consumers. Expectations of other consumers’ behavior
usually lead to non-monotonic demand functions and self-fulfilling multiple equilibria: a
network that looks like succeeding (or failing) will as a result do so.
In this paper we consider a good with network effects which consumers can purchase in
any of two periods (if at all). We model this problem as a dynamic game where a monopolist
sells a network good to a population of consumers, who have private correlated intrinsic
values for the good produced by the monopolist. In the beginning, each consumer receives
a signal which is partially informative about both his intrinsic value and the fundamental
representing the network quality. Then the firm announces a price for the first period and
consumers decide whether or not to buy the product. Before the second period, adoption in
the first period is realized and becomes public information. The monopolist will then post
a second-period price and those consumers who have not joined the network in the first
period make the final purchase decision. In this model, consumers face a trade-off regarding
the delay of adoption choice. On one hand, waiting is costly because of late consumption
and can also be costly because prices may raise when the network is successful. On the
other hand, it is beneficial due to the more accurate information about adoption by other
consumers and quality of the product. The option to delay might affect the demand function
significantly, which in turn would affect the firm’s profit-maximizing price.
The coordination problem among consumers is at the heart of models of goods with
network effects and are also the source of the multiplicity of equilibria. Our analysis of the
two period game with both consumers and firms taking actions requires further extension
of the current state of the art. Our model builds on the literature on global games (see
Carlsson and van Damme (1994); Morris and Shin (1998, 2001 and 2003)) in accounting
for the fact that information structure is a crucial element in coordination models. We
show that there exists a unique equilibrium of the game under some conditions on the
parameters of the model. Taste heterogeneity, correlation of the valuations and imperfectly
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informed consumers generate a well-defined demand curve and profit-maximizing problem.
Correlation in the valuation of consumers will “educate” their guesses about adoption and
is an important feature to deliver uniqueness. With consumer heterogeneity about the
intrinsic value of the good, the most enthusiastic consumers will typically become the early
adopters, and those who are less enthusiastic will delay their purchase decision to future
periods, when they will learn more about the product or about what other consumers are
doing.
The general model that we consider nests the cases of herding and pure durable goods as
special cases. In what we call the “herding version” of our model, we shut down the network
effects and are stressing the importance of others’ actions in the decision process. In the
“full version” or the model, which includes information acquisition and network effects, the
coordination problem associated to the decision of consumers stresses the complementarities
in actions. In the “pure durable goods” version of the model, there are no informational
gains (no herding) nor complementarities in actions (no network effects) and the basic
choice weights early consumption versus lower price.
We illustrate the behavior that can emerge using a baseline parameterization of our
model. We find two main results: first, the “critical mass effect” from the consumption
behavior; the second-period consumption can be very sensitive to the adoption in the first-
period. There exists a threshold fundamental quality below which there is no consumption
in the second-period even when the price is equal to the monopolist’s marginal cost. When
the fundamental is above this threshold, the second period equilibrium demand rapidly
increases in the fundamental. Second, the model features the “introductory price” phe-
nomenon: with positive probability the monopolist increases its price over time. If the
first-period consumption is high, then the positive feedback effect shifts the demand curve
up. Therefore, the monopolist finds it optimal to announce a high price in the terminal
period. This phenomenon does not happen in the case of pure durable goods, where prices
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are strictly decreasing over time.
Our paper relates to several strands in the literature on network effects.1 Following
Farrell and Saloner (1986), the literature on dynamic market with network effects mainly
used sequential choice models where each consumer makes the adoption decision at each
time.2 This paper allows the continuum of consumers to simultaneously choose whether
to join the network or wait, and the heterogeneous value and incomplete information lead
to a unique equilibrium. As a result, our model generates richer dynamics such as positive
feedback and critical mass effect.
There are papers studying delayed purchases for the case of unsponsored network(s),
i.e., when firms problem are not incorporated in the model. Choi (1997) shows in the
model with two consumers that allowing option to delay leads to less adoption since each
consumer would want the other to experiment on the new technology (which he calls a
“penguin effect”). We show in the model with a continuum of consumers and a monopolist
pricing that adoption in the case with delay can be substantially larger than in the static
benchmark case (no delay). Rysman (2003) analyzes adoption delay in a standards war
(targeting the 56K modem case), where the delay occurs as the result of differentiated
standards and because one type of consumer is not much enthusiastic about any specific
technology. Contrary to these papers, the present paper considers the case of endogenous
pricing, rich set of consumer types and does not suffer from multiplicity of equilibria.
This paper also contributes to the literature on monopoly price dynamics and Coase
conjecture. Cabral, Salant, and Woroch (1999) study monopoly penetration pricing of
durable network goods when buyers have rational expectations. In certain classes of exam-
ple, they find that Coase conjecture price dynamics tend to predominate over penetration
pricing: prices fall rather than rise over time, especially when there is complete information.
1See Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for an excellent survey.
2For more recent paper, see Chen, Doraszelski, and Harrington (2009) and Cabral (2011).
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Radner et al (2014) study a network monopolist’s dynamic pricing problem when adopters
expect each period’s network size to be equal to last period’s; they find extreme bargain-
then-ripoff pricing (the monopolist prices at zero until the network reaches its desired size).
The present paper exhibits increasing price path over time with positive probability when
network effects are considered.
Cabral (2011) studies dynamic price competition between two proprietary networks in
an infinite period model with overlapping generations of consumers. He states conditions
for equilibrium existence and uniqueness. Due to difficulty of getting analytical results,
the main results of the paper are derived for restricted sets of parameter values and some
simulations are performed in order to verify the robustness for a broader range of parameter
values. Cabral’s model assumes complete market coverage, meaning that consumers are
not allowed to make delayed purchases. Moreover, in Cabral’s paper there is no role for
consumers’ coordination since only one consumer is taking a decision per period.
Methodologically, the model of this paper is a global game with private correlated
values. To the best of our knowledge, Argenziano (2008) and Julien and Pavan (2016) are
the only papers in the literature to apply the ideas of global games to problems related to
industrial organization. Argenziano (2008) considers competition between two firms in a
one-sided market with network effects and signals perfectly informative about the private
values. Julien and Pavan (2016) consider a static model of two-sided markets in which
agents have incomplete information about quality. Compared to these papers, we model
a dynamic game with an option to delay and focus on the adoption decisions and price
dynamics. Additionally, we allow for information acquisition about the intrinsic value of
the good. In the context of investment games, Dasgupta (2007) allows the players to delay
their choice and shows that the delay leads to more efficient coordination: the present paper
considers the market with network effects and adds the monopolist’s endogenous pricing
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decision.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
analyzes the static version of the model as a benchmark. In Section 4 we analyze the equi-
librium of the model and discuss the uniqueness conditions. Section 5 presents a numerical
analysis of the model, starting with a description of the algorithm used to compute the
equilibrium and proceeding with a simulation of the model for a given parameterization.
There we compare the full specification with the particular cases of pure durable goods,
herding and the benchmark static model. Section 6 concludes and discusses questions for
future work.
2.1 Model
The model consists of two periods t = 1, 2. A monopolistic firm sells a network good to a
continuum of consumers of mass normalized to one, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. In the beginning
of the first period, each consumer receives a signal which is informative about her value
for the good. Next, the firm announces a price p1, and consumers simultaneously decide
whether or not to join the network. In the beginning of the second period, the firm and
consumers observe adoption in the first-period. The firm will then announce the second-
period price p2 and consumers who did not purchase in the first period choose whether to
join the network. Adoption decisions are irreversible.
If consumer i joins the network at time t, his payoff is
vi + α(n1 + n2)− pt,
where vi is consumer i’s intrinsic value
4 of the network good, nt is the measure of consumers
3See also Heidhues and Melissas (2006).
4Other terminologies for vi from the literature are intrinsic benefit (Armstrong and Wright (2007)),
stand-alone valuation (Julien and Pavan (2016)), and membership benefit (Weyl (2010)).
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who join the network at time t, and pt is the price of the network at time t.
5 The utility
obtained from not joining any network is normalized to zero. We also assume that the cost
of production is zero. Consumers and firm discounts the future at rate δ ∈ (0, 1).
The intrinsic value vi is given by
vi = θ + hi,
where θ is the fundamental quality of the network good and hi is an idiosyncratic valuation.
The fundamental θ is common across all consumers and is distributed normally with mean
µ and variance σ2θ . The idiosyncratic valuation hi is distributed according to a normal
distribution with mean zero and variance σ2h. θ and hi are independent of each other as
well as across i. Consumers’ valuations are correlated due to the presence of the common
component θ.
In the beginning of the game, consumer i privately observes xi which is partially infor-
mative about both θ and hi. Specifically, we assume that
xi = θ + ηi,
where ηi ∼ N (0, σ2h).6 and corr (ηi, hi) = τ . The η′is are independent across consumers and
are independent of θ. Each consumer observes xi but cannot identify θ and ηi separately.
5Even though the functional form of the consumer’s payoff is particularly well suited to describe direct
network effects, one can also think of these specifications as a reduced form representation of indirect
network effects. Suppose for example that m is the number of applications (auxiliary/complementary
products) for the network. Then Ui,t will be a positive function of m, say gi (m). Since m depends on
n, through, say m = h (n), then Ui,t depends on gi (h (n)), i.e., Ui,t is ultimately a function of n. Under
indirect network effects it is also possible to justify the linearity of Ui,t on n1 and n2 under some assumptions
about the cost structure of firms providing complementary products.
6For simplicity we assume that the variances of hi and ηi are the same.
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The correlation of signals associated to consumers i and i′ is given by






Finally, the correlation of the signal of consumer i with his intrinsic value is
κ ≡ corr (xi, vi) =
cov (xi, vi)√
var (xi) var (vi)
=












When α 6= 0, consumer i’s utility depends on the purchase decision of other consumers.
Because of this dependence, consumer i’s beliefs about the decision of other consumers
will ultimately affect her decision of whether or not to join the network. The common
component θ is the source of correlation between the private valuations and is also the
relevant element to characterize the beliefs (consumers’ expectations) about the decision
of other consumers.
The environment just described implies that the coordination game played by the con-
sumers is a global game with private correlated values. The intrinsic value vji is private
in the sense that it tells the value of good j to consumer i excluding the network effect.
Correlation comes from the common component θ, as discussed before.
This framework nests two interesting cases. First, when α = 0 (no network effects) and
τ < 1 (information acquisition) we have the case of herding. Second, when α = 0 and
τ = 1 we have the case of pure durable goods.
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2.2 Benchmark: Static Model
As a benchmark, consider the case in which the consumers make the adoption decision only
once. The payoff of the consumer who adopts is given by
vi + αn− p,
where n is the mass of consumers joining the network. We are interested in the equilibrium
with monotone strategies: if a consumer with signal xi chooses to join the network, then
all consumers with xi′ > xi will also join. Any monotone strategy of the consumers can be
characterized by a cutoff x̄ where the consumer joins the network if and only if xi ≥ x̄.
We start with the consumer’s problem. Given a price p, consumer i will join the network
if
Ui ≡ E [vi + αn|xi]− p ≥ 0.
Under monotone strategies, the mass of consumers joining the network is


























The marginal consumer x̄ must be indifferent between adopting and not adopting since
Ui is continuous in xi. Therefore, her indifference condition is given by
(1− κ)µ+ κx̄+ αΦ ((µ− x) z1) = p. (2.2.1)





2π. Then x̄ is uniquely determined for any p. Moreover,
x̄ is increasing in p.
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Proof. Given any p, The function
(1− κ)µ+ κx̄+ αΦ ((µ− x) z1)− p
will be negative for sufficiently negative values of x and will be positive for sufficiently high
values of x. Since this function is continuous in x, Intermediate Value Theorem implies that
there exists a solution to above indifference condition. Uniqueness is obtained by showing
monotonicity of the left-hand side of the indifference condition:
∂(LHS)
∂x








2π, completing the proof of uniqueness. Monotonic-
ity also follows.
The uniqueness condition is satisfied in two cases. First, for sufficiently small σh. In
this case, we have ρ → 1 so z1 becomes small. This corresponds to the case where the
degree of heterogeneity is small relative to the uncertainty about the quality. Since there is
high correlation between the xi’s, the degree of strategic uncertainty becomes insensitive to
the signal. Second, for sufficiently high σh and small σθ. In this case, we have ρ→ 0 with
high σ2h, so z1 becomes sufficiently small. This corresponds to the case where the degree
of heterogeneity is large. Since idiosyncratic payoffs are almost uncorrelated, the degree of
strategic uncertainty again becomes insensitive to the signal.
The next proposition shows that the threshold consumer has virtually no information
about the aggregate choices. This is called Laplacian property and was introduced by
Morris and Shin (2003, p. 62) for the case of improper uniform prior beliefs.
Proposition 2. The distribution of n (θ) conditional on xi = x is uniform on [0, 1].
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Proof. Since xi = θ + hi and hi ∼ N (0, σ2h),




























= 1− (1− z) = z
which proves the result.






(p− c)E [N(x̄(p), θ)] ,
subject to (2.2.1). By plugging the constraint into the profit function, we have
max
x
((1− κ)µ+ κx̄+ αΦ ((µ− x) z1)− c)Φ (β(x̄)) ,






(κ− αz1φ ((µ− x) z1))Φ (β(x̄))︸ ︷︷ ︸
benefit from price increase
=




φ (β(x̄)) .︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost from demand decrease
Solving, we have









which gives the optimal x̄. Combining this with (2.2.1), we have the firm’s optimal price






φ (β(x̄))︸ ︷︷ ︸
markup
. (2.2.3)







We are interested in the equilibrium with monotone strategies: if a consumer with signal
xi chooses to join the network at period n, then all consumers with xi′ > xi join at period
t′ ≤ t. Any monotone strategy of the consumers can be characterized by the sequence of
cutoffs x̄1 and x̄2 (x̄1 ≥ x̄2) where the remaining consumers at period t join the network
if and only if xi ≥ x̄t. For a monotone strategy (x̄1, x̄2) and a fundamental θ, the mass of
consumers joining the network in each period is given by

















Second Period: Consumer’s Problem After the first period, the mass of consumers
in the network n1 is publicly observed, so the fundamental θ is perfectly known. After
the firm announces a price p2, All consumers who delayed their decision in the first period
decide to join the network or not. The consumer i will join the network in the second
period if
Ui,2 = E [vi + α(n1 + n2)|xi, θ]− p2 ≥ 0.
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Given a monotone strategy (x̄1, x̄2),


















since hi|ηi ∼ N (τηi, (1− τ)σ2h) and ηi = xi − θ.
Let’s first consider the equilibrium where x̄2 < x̄1, that is, a positive measure of con-
sumers join the network in the second period. In this case, consumer x̄2 must be indifferent
between buying and not buying since Ui,2 is continuous in xi. Therefore, his indifference
condition in the second period is given by






Let x̂2(p2; θ) be the solution of (2.3.1). This condition will characterize the second period
threshold whenever x̂2(p2; θ) < x1. If x̂2(p2; θ) ≥ x1, all consumers who waited in the first
period are better off not buying the product, hence x2 = x1. This corresponds to the
situation in which no consumer will join the platform in the second period for the given
realization of θ and the price charged by the existing platform, p2. Therefore, the cutoff
function x2 (p2; x̄1, θ) is defined as
x2 (p2; x̄1, θ) = min{x̄1, x̂2 (p2; θ)}.
A unique threshold in the second period relies on sufficiently large consumer hetero-







This assumption will be satisfied under sufficiently large heterogeneity or a mild con-
temporaneous network externality in the second period7.
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumption 3 holds. Then given any x̄1 and θ, x̄2 (p2; x̄1, θ) is
uniquely determined for any p2 ≥ c. Moreover, x̄2 is nondecreasing in p2.
Proof. Given x̄1, θ and p2 ≥ c, all terms in (2.3.1) are bounded, except for x2. Then,






will be negative for sufficiently negative values of x2 and will be positive for sufficiently high
values of x2. Since this function is continuous in x2, Intermediate Value Theorem implies
that there exists a solution to (2.3.1). Uniqueness is obtained by showing monotonicity of
the left-hand side of (2.3.1):
∂(LHS)
∂x2












which is strictly positive under Assumption 3, completing the proof of uniqueness. Mono-
tonicity also follows.
Second Period: Network’s Problem For any x̄1 and θ, (2.3.1) characterizes the
second-period demand function N2(x̄1, x2(p2), θ) as a function of p2. Given this, the mo-
nopolist chooses the price p2 that maximizes the second-period profit Π2(p2; x̄1, θ):
max
p2≥c
Π2(p2; x̄1, θ) = max
p2≥c
(p2 − c)N2(x̄1, x2(p2), θ)
s.t. x2 (p2; x̄1, θ) = min{x̄1, x̂2 (p2; x̄1, θ)}.
7(Add a brief discussion based on Morris and Shin (2006) and Herrendorf et al (2000)). We will see that
the condition for uniqueness in the first period relies on the opposite: sufficiently low heterogeneity. This
is important there because it leads to a high correlation of the signals and also very precise information
about the fundamental θ.
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Depending on the realization of θ, the monopolist may or may not be able to make a
positive profit. To understand why this is the case, note that if θ turns out to be sufficiently
low, then the second-period network size n2 can be zero even if the network sets the price
equal to its marginal cost. Specifically, given p2 the second-period network size n2 would be
zero when consumer x̄1 would find optimal not to join the network. That is, from (2.3.1),






Define θ(x̄1) be the solution of the equation






Note that θ(x̄1) is uniquely defined, and under Assumption 3 θ(x̄1) is decreasing in x̄1.
Then (2.3.1) implies that, x2 = x̄1 (and hence n2 = 0) for any p2 ≥ c if and only if θ < θ.
In this case the monopolist cannot make a positive profit. We assume that for θ ≤ θ, the
monopolist charges its marginal cost c.
Now consider the case where θ > θ. In this case, there exists a price p2 > c at which
the demand is positive and the network earns positive profit. Therefore, the firm’s optimal
price must be strictly greater than c, and x̄2 must satisfy (2.3.1), that is, x̄2 = x̂2 (p2; x̄1, θ).
Then the optimal p2 is the solution to
max
p2≥c
Π2(p2; x̄1, θ) ≡ max
p2≥c
(p2 − c)N2(x̄2(p2))
s.t. p2 = (1− τ)θ + τ x̄2 + α(N1 +N2(x̄2(p2)))















benefit from price increase


















N2(x2) = (1− τ)θ + τ x̄2 + α(N1 +N2(x̄2))− c, or




























Assumption 5 is a stronger version of Assumption 3 and is used in the next proposition
to show single peakedness of the second period profit function.
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumption 5 holds. Then given any x̄1 and θ, the network’s
problem in the second period has unique solution, which is determined by the first-order
condition (2.3.3).
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Proof. It is sufficient to show that for any x̄1 and θ, the second-period profit as a function
of x̄2,
Π2(x̄2) = ((1− τ)θ + τ x̄2 + α (N1 +N2(x̄2))− c)N2(x2),
is single-peaked for x̄2 ∈ (−∞, x̄1). It is clear that Π2(x̄1) = 0 and limx̄2→−∞Π2(x̄2) < 0.
Since there exists x̄2 ∈ (−∞, x̄1) such that Π2(x̄2) > 0, it suffices to show that the first-order






N2(x2) = −(1− τ)θ − αN1 + c. (2.3.5)
Taking the derivative of the left-hand side of (2.3.5) we have
∂(LHS)
∂x̄2
= 2τ − 2 α
σh




















What is the lower bound on minξ ξ
Φ(ξ)
φ(ξ)
? Let ξ∗ = arg minξ ξ
Φ(ξ)
φ(ξ)






























and then under Assumption 5, the left-hand side of (2.3.5) is strictly increasing in x̄2, which
guarantees the uniqueness of the solution of (2.3.5).
The equilibrium analysis in the second period gives a unique pair (p2, x̄2) as functions
of x̄1 and θ. We now turn to the equilibrium analysis in the first period.
First Period: Consumer’s Problem Now we consider the equilibrium behavior in the
first period given the second-period behavior p2(x̄1, θ) and x̄2(x̄1, θ). In the first period,
consumer i receives a signal xi, observes the first-period price p1, and then chooses whether
to join the network. Given a monotone strategy x̄1, if consumer xi joins the network in the
first period, his expected payoff is
(1− κ)µ+ κx1 + αEθ [N1(x1, θ) +N2(x1, x2(x1, θ), θ)|xi]− p1.
On the other hand, if he delays his purchase decision his payoff is discounted by δ but he
has the option to purchase or not after θ is realized. In this case, his expected payoff is
given by
δEθ [max {0, (1− τ)θ + τxi + α(N1(x1, θ) +N2(x1, x2(x1, θ), θ))− p2(x̄1, θ)} |xi] ,
or
δ Pr θ(x̄2(x̄1, θ) < xi|xi) {(1− τ)θ + τxi + Eθ [α(N1 +N2)− p2(x̄1, θ)|xi,x̄2(x̄1, θ) < x̄i]} ,
since consumer i joins the network in the second period if and only if xi ≥ x̄2(x̄1, θ). The
consumer who receives a signal x̄1 must be indifferent between joining the network and
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delaying the purchase. Therefore, his indifference condition is given by
(1− κ)µ+ κx1 + αEθ [N1 +N2|x̄1]− p1
= δ Pr θ(x̄2 < x̄1|x̄1) {(1− τ)θ + τ x̄1 + Eθ [α(N1 +N2)− p2|x̄1, x̄2 < x̄1]}
Since (2.3.1) holds whenever x̄2(x̄1, θ) < x̄1, we have
(1− κ)µ+ κx1 + αEθ [N1 +N2|x̄1]− p1 = δ Pr θ(x̄2 < x̄1|x̄1)τ {x̄1 − Eθ [x̄2|x̄1, x̄2 < x̄1]} .
We have shown that x2 < x̄1 if θ > θ, and x2 = x̄1 otherwise, with θ defined in (2.3.2).
The indifference condition can then be rewritten as












where, conditional on the consumers being the marginal type in period 1, x1, the sum(
N̄1 (x1) + N̄2 (x1)
)
represents the expected adoption:









= Φ ((µ− x1) z1) ,














θ − x̄2(x̄1, θ)
σh
)
f (θ|x1) dθ − N̄1 (x1) ,
the term Q̄ (x1) represents the probability of no consumption in the second period
Q̄ (x1) = Pr [x̄2(x̄1, θ) = x̄1|x1] = Pr [θ ≤ θ|x1] ,
which means that 1− Q̄ (x1) is the probability that the network will not die in the second
period. X̄2c(x̄1) the expected second period threshold:












The next proposition shows that there are ranges of parameter values for which demand
is a well defined function of prices.
Proposition 7. There exists ρ and σ̄h such that for any ρ < ρ and σh > σ̄h, x̄1 and p1
have one-to-one relationship.
Proof. Let H(x̄1) be the right-hand side of (2.3.6), that is,
H(x̄1) = (1− κ)µ+ κx1 + α
(






= (1− κ)µ+ κx1 + αΦ ((µ− x1) z1) +
ˆ ∞
θ
A(x̄1, θ)f (θ|x1) dθ,
where A(x̄1, θ) = αN2 (x1, θ) − δτ(x̄1 − x̄2 (x1, θ)). Then there exists unique equilibrium




= κ− z1αφ((µ− x̄1)z1) +
ˆ ∞
θ






















+ [α {Φ2 − Φ1} − δτ {x̄1 − x̄2}]
ρ(θ − ((1− ρ)µ+ ρx̄1)
(1− ρ)σ2θ
f (θ|x1) , (2.3.8)










.When ρ → 0, the second term of the right-hand
side of (2.3.8) converges to zero. This is because both Φ2 − Φ1 and x̄1 − x̄2 are bounded





N2(x̄1, x̄2). (This is
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Hence the first term of the right-hand side of (2.3.8) converges to zero as well. Therefore,
(2.3.7) is positive, which completes the proof.
.
First Period: Network’s problem Given the first-period demand x̄1(p1), and second-
period behavior (x̄2(x̄1, θ), p2(x̄1, θ)), the firm chooses the first-period price which maximizes
the discounted sum of expected profit, that is,
p∗1 = arg max
p1
Eθ [Π1(p1) + δΠ2(x̄1(p1), x̄2(x̄1, θ), θ)] ,
= arg max
p1
(p1 − c)Eθ [N1(p1)] + δEθ [(p2(x̄1(p1), θ)− c)N2(x̄1(p1), x̄2(x̄1, θ), θ)]
subject to (2.3.3), (2.3.4), and (2.3.6).
Equivalently, by Proposition 7, we can rewrite the firm’s problem as one in which the
firm chooses the optimal cutoff x̄1 :8
x̄∗1 = arg max
x̄1










+ δEθ [(p2(x̄1, θ)− c)N2(x̄1, x̄2(x̄1, θ), θ)] ,
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In this Section we provide a numerical exercise to illustrate the rich dynamics of the full
specification and compare with the benchmark cases of herding, pure durable goods and
static models. We start with a description of the algorithm used to compute the equilibrium.
2.4.1 Algorithm for the computation of the equilibrium









involves the following steps:
1. Given a first-period cutoff x1 and fundamental θ, find the second-period cutoff x̄2 (x̄1, θ)
in the following way: let x̃2(x̄1, θ) be the solution to the first-order condition (2.3.3):








Then x̄2 (θ, x1) is given by
x2 (x̄1, θ) =

x1 if θ ≤ θ,
x̃2 (x̄1, θ) if θ > θ,
where θ is given by (2.3.2):



















Note that p2 = c if and only if θ ≤ θ.
3. From the indifference condition (2.3.6), determine p1 as a function of x̄1 :











θ − x̄2(x̄1, θ)
σh
)
− δτ(x̄1 − x̄2 (x1, θ))
]
f (θ|x1) dθ.
4. Finally, find the firm’s optimal first-period cutoff x̄1 that maximizes the lifetime
expected profit of the network: (this is equivalent to find the price p1, given that p1
and x̄1 have one-to-one relationship)
x̄∗1 = arg max
x̄1










+ δEθ[(p2(x̄1, θ)− c)N2(x̄1, θ)]
subject to (2.3.3), (2.3.4), and (2.3.6).
2.4.2 Simulation
In this section we discuss the results of simulations for a specific calibration of the param-
eters. Recall that the marginal cost for the monopolist is assumed to be zero throughout
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this paper and that the utility of consumer i at time t is
Ui,t = vi + α (n1 + n2)− pt.







Table 2.1: Parameterization of the model.
We set τ = 0.5 unless in the cases where signals are perfectly informative about the
intrinsic value (i.e., τ = 1).
2.4.2.1 Model with Network Effects
First, we present the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic model with both network effects
(characterized by α = 2.5) and the informational (herding) effect (characterized by τ < 1).
Optimal first period price for the parameterization above is p∗1 = 2.42. Figure (2.1) shows
the second period price as a function of θ, where we can see that second period prices will
be larger than p∗1 with positive probability. If the fundamental is below θ(x1) ' −3, we
have x̄2 = x̄1, which implies that prices are set to the marginal cost level and there will be
zero demand in the second period.
74
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium prices p1 and p2 (θ) for the model with network effects and infor-
mation acquisition (τ = 0.5)
Figure (2.2) shows the adoption in both periods as a function of θ. First period con-
sumption is a positive function of θ and for values of θ around zero, there is substantial
delay. We see the occurrence of tipping: there is a minimum level of adoption in the first
period that will induce consumption in the second period, otherwise the network will die
in period two. This is the case even with the monopolist posting a price at its marginal
cost (zero in the current case). The total demand shows a kink at θ = θ, with the “critical
mass effect”: the total demand is very sensitive to θ once θ ≥ θ. Consumer’s collective
behavior shows the positive feedback effect, in the sense that the second-period reaction
crucially depends on the size of the first-period consumption.
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium share of consumers joining the network in each period and the
total share of consumers joining the network as a function of the fundamental θ for the
cases the full model with network effects and information acquisition (τ = 0.5).
We now turn to the case of the dynamic model with network effects and full information
about vi (i.e., τ = 1). Figure (2.3) describes the equilibrium price in both periods. The
first period price in this case is p∗1 = 3.38, nearly 40% larger than in the case without full
information about vi. On the other hand, the function describing second period prices is
flatter than the one in the former case. Second period prices can still be larger than p∗1,
but with lower probability than in the case with τ < 1. It is worth noting that the model
with complete information about τ does not exhibit the occurrence of tipping, as we se in
Figure (2.4).
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium prices p1 and p2 (θ) for the model with network effects and signals
perfectly informative about intrinsic value of the good (τ = 1).
Figure 2.4: Equilibrium share of consumers joining the network in each period and the
total share of consumers joining the network as a function of the fundamental θ for the
model with network effects and signals perfectly informative about intrinsic value of the
good (τ = 1).
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2.4.2.2 Static Model with Network Effects
In the static version of the model, the optimal monopolist’s price is pstatic = 3.37. Only for
low values of θ, adoption in the static model will be higher than that of the full specification
presented in Figure (2.2).
Figure 2.5: Equilibrium share of consumers joining the network in as a function of the
fundamental θ in the static model with network effects and signals perfectly informative
about the intrinsic value of the good (τ = 1).
2.4.2.3 Herding Model
Next we consider the case in which there is no direct network effect (α = 0), but still
consumers do not have complete information about their intrinsic value (τ < 1) so there is
a informational herding effect.
Figure (2.6) shows the equilibrium prices p1 and p2 (θ). First period price is similar to
the one charged in the model with network effects, but generates much lower consumption.
In terms of second period prices, for low values of the fundamental, the firm posts a price
equal to its marginal cost (zero); if the fundamental high enough, then the firm posts a
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price higher than p1.
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium prices p1 and p2 (θ) for the herding model.
Figure (2.7) describes the equilibrium demand in each period, and the sum of the de-
mand, as a function of the fundamental θ. Delayed purchases happen more when consumers
have “good news” about the quality of the good and adoption is strictly lower than in the
case with network effects for the entire range of θ. Also, there is no feature related to crit-
ical mass as in the case with network effects. Comparing the results from the pure herding
model with the versions with network effects, we conclude that information interact with
network effects in order to generate “tipping” in this model.
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Figure 2.7: Equilibrium share of consumers purchasing the good in each period and the
total share of consumers joining the network as a function of the fundamental θ for the
case of the herding model (τ < 1 and α = 0).
2.4.2.4 Pure Durable Good
The final version examined in this simulation is the case of pure durable goods monopoly,
in which there is no network effect (α = 0) and consumers are fully informed about their
intrinsic value (τ = 1). In this case, the equilibrium behavior is very different from the one
with the network effects. Figure (2.8) shows the equilibrium prices p1 and p2 (θ). First we
observe that there is no increasing price path: the second period price is lower than first
period price with probability one. Furthermore, the optimal first-period price in the pure
durable goods monopoly is lower than the one with network effects. Figure (2.9) describes
the equilibrium demand in each period as a function of the fundamental θ. In this case,
delay occurs only due to expectation of lower future prices. There is no feature related to
critical mass as in the case with network effects.
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Figure 2.8: Equilibrium prices p1 and p2 (θ) for the pure durable goods model.
Figure 2.9: Equilibrium share of consumers purchasing the good in each period and the
total share of consumers joining the network as a function of the fundamental θ for the
case of the pure durable goods model (τ = 1 and α = 0).
2.4.2.5 Adoption and profits in the different versions of the model
Table 2 shows that the different assumptions about α and τ can generate potentially very
different prices in the first period. Uncertain about the intrinsic value vi seems to induce
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lower first period prices. Moreover, when vi is unknown, the existence of network effects
permit the firm to charge a slightly higher price compared to the pure herding model.
Interestingly, the higher prices for the case with network effects are associated to a much
larger adoption in the first period (see Figures 2 and 7).
Model Price in the first period
Network effects (α > 0) with unknown vi (τ < 1) 2.41
Network effects (α > 0) with vi known (τ = 1) 3.38
Static model with vi unknown (τ < 1) 2.06
Static model with vi known (τ = 1) 3.37
Herding model (α = 0, τ < 1) 2.37
Pure durable goods (α = 0, τ = 1) 3.08
Table 2.2: First period equilibrium prices in the different versions of the model.
Figure (2.10) presents the total adoption for different specifications of the model as a
function of the fundamental parameter θ. The model with network effects and uncertainty
about vi generates a considerably larger consumer base than the different benchmarks for
a wide range of values of θ. The only specification than is dominated by the full model
in terms of adoption is the case of herding. In the other three cases (network effects with
vi known, pure durable goods and static model with network effects and vi known), total
adoption will be larger than that in the full specification when the realized fundamental is
sufficiently low.
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Figure 2.10: Total adoption in the different specifications of the model.
The larger adoption in the case of the dynamic model with network effects does not
translate into higher profits when we compare with the benchmark static model. Only for
intermediate values of θ, the monopolist profit in the model with delay will be higher than
in the static model. For extreme realizations of θ, the static model will be more profitable
for different reasons depending in which tail we are located. When θ is low, then the lower
profits in the full specification are simply because of small number of adopters. On the
other hand, when θ is high, since first period price is set based on expectations, the realized
adoption in the first period will be high and there will be just not many consumers left in
the second period in order to allow the monopolistic to extract a high rent.
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Figure 2.11: Total profits of the monopolist in the different specifications of the model.
Given the shape of the profit function for the case with network effects with complete
and incomplete information about vi, one can imagine that investment in advertisement
which would increase the information about vi acts as an insurance, increasing the profits
of the firm in the case of extreme realizations of the fundamental.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
We consider a market with network effects in which consumers can decide if and when to
purchase a good with network effects. We develop a simple yet rich model that is capable of
exploring many issues in the economics of network effects such as introductory pricing and
early critical mass for platform survival. Our specification nests the pure durables goods
and herding models. We derive uniqueness conditions for equilibrium of the dynamic model
with endogenous delayed purchases.
Comparing the adoption in the versions with network effects and in the pure herding
model, we conclude that incomplete information about the intrinsic value of the good is
important in order to generate “tipping” in this model. Numerical results illustrate the
84
richness of possible outcomes in the dynamic model and highlight the differences relative
to the benchmark cases in terms of pricing, adoption and profits.
We leave for future research an extension of this model to the case of platform com-





Product improvement is an important competitive strategy. It differentiates products,
and sets the stage for price competition. Twin considerations of market uncertainty and
strategic uncertainty shape incentives for product improvement. First, firms are unclear
about how consumers value their products. Second, firms are unsure about rivals’ quality
decisions. The information structure of the market determines the interplay of these kinds
of uncertainty.
The residential market for broadband Internet service is a case in point. A typical local
market is a duopoly served by a cable TV company (e.g. Comcast or Time Warner) and a
telephone company (e.g. AT&T or Verizon). Cable companies and telephone companies re-
cently pursued strategies of upgrading their networks in selected markets. Cable companies
widely adopted the DOCSIS 3.0 standard permitting higher bandwidth data transmission,
while telephone companies more selectively invested to extend fiber optic plant to customer
premises (e.g. Verizon FIOS) or to a neighborhood interface (e.g. AT&T U-Verse). These
network upgrades dramatically improved download and upload speeds. The fiber optic up-
grades of the telephone companies arguably were more costly but provided higher-quality
service than the improved cable broadband service. In deciding where and when to invest,
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telephone companies like AT&T and Verizon were uncertain about market acceptance, and
in some cases unsure of how quickly cable rivals would deploy the new DOCSIS 3.0 stan-
dard. Similarly, in deciding the speed and scope of DOCSIS 3.0 deployment, cable TV
companies needed to assess market conditions and rivalry with telephone companies.
We develop a model of product quality competition that focuses on how information
structure determines equilibrium outcomes. We focus on the case of duopoly entry into a
market with the option to upgrade the product quality. Market uncertainty is captured
by the idea that, while firms are symmetric ex ante, one or the other will have an ex post
brand advantage of uncertain magnitude, Γ. Strategic uncertainty is captured by the idea
that firms make their product quality decisions with privately-observed noisy information
about brand advantage. We consider the case of limited preference heterogeneity, which
leads to a corner solution in the Bertrand price equilibrium following the quality upgrade
stage. In this equilibrium, the firm selling higher quality good sets its price equal to the
quality difference, and the rival firm sets its price to zero.
We investigate equilibrium strategies under three information structures associated to
Γ: (i) complete information; (ii) incomplete information with no signal; and (iii) incomplete
information with each firm receiving privately correlated signals about Γ.
In the case of complete information about Γ, there is an interval around zero with two
pure strategy Nash equilibria each having one firm investing in quality and the other not,
as well as a strictly mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The profits in the pure strategy
equilibria are very different even when the quality difference is arbitrarily small. In the
mixed strategy equilibrium, miscoordination results either in wasteful investment or failure
to improve.
The case of incomplete information deals with the criticism that firms might be unsure
about who has the advantage and its size. Except in a non-generic special case, sufficient
uncertainty about brand advantage will lead to a unique equilibrium. However, the equilib-
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rium outcomes in the regions of unique equilibrium result in either wasteful investment or
failure to improve. In the equilibrium with investment by the two firms, the loser firm will
always have negative profits. Interestingly, the winning firm can also end up with negative
profit, which will occur when the realized brand advantage is sufficiently small. Since price
charged by the winning firm is proportional to the excess quality, a small brand advantage
might not cover the investment cost. This provides some intuition for why we need σΓ high
for uniqueness: firms need to believe that there is enough chance to get favorable values
of Γ. The mixed strategy BNE converges to the complete information MSNE as market
uncertainty vanishes. Most qualitative results remain unchanged when we modify the game
imposing prices to be defined before the realization of Γ.
In the case of incomplete information with each firm receiving privately correlated sig-
nals about Γ, this strategic interaction becomes a global game1. We show that equilibrium
product improvement decisions are unique if and only if market uncertainty is sufficiently
high relative to strategic uncertainty. One important thing about uniqueness of equilibrium
in this case is the ability that one firm has to use its own signal to update the distribution
of signals of the other firm. The higher the correlation between the signals of the two
firms, the more accurate will be this prediction and the lower will be the probability of
miscoordination.
This paper is related to the literature on entry games, interpreted in a broad sense to
include the introduction of a new product or the adoption of a new technology. We can
divide the entry models in two groups: identical firms (e.g. Mankiw and Whinston (1986),
Bresnahan and Reiss (1988, 1990, 1991), Berry and Waldfogel (1999)) and heterogeneous
firms (e.g. Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2003) and Seim (2005)). In our model, firms are ex
ante identical but one or the other will have an ex post brand advantage. In the appendix
we consider a variation in which firms have asymmetric payoffs. Multiple equilibria is a
1See Carlsson and Van-Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2003).
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typical problem in entry models, which has motivated new estimation methods in the form
of moment inequalities (e.g. Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Andrews and Jia (2012) and
Pakes, Porter, Ho and Ishii (2015)).
We build on and contribute to the literature on investments in quality upgrade. Shaked
and Sutton (1982) show that one benefit of quality differentiation is that it relaxes price
competition. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980) as well as Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983 and
1984) are the seminal works in vertical product differentiation. These models of quality
choice assume that firms invest in quality before the market competition stage, which
implies that the cost of product improvement is sunk when competition takes place. Gilbert
and Riordan (2007) consider a winner-take-all duopoly model in which firms invest in
product improvement. They discuss different equilibria that may arise depending on the
vertical relations in the market and the options for equilibrium selection. In this paper
we revisit the problem that the coordination game played by the firms may have multiple
equilibria with very different equilibrium outcomes in a winner-take-all market. Multiplicity
of equilibria is problematic for counterfactuals and policy analysis in the absence of a reliable
selection criterion2. Investment decisions in these circumstances rely to a large extent on
coordinated behavior of the firms, which implies that the information structure plays a
crucial role in the determination of which equilibrium will be played. We focus on the
interplay between information and actions in a quality improvement game, exploring how
beliefs are determined and the conditions under which equilibrium is unique.
Methodologically, the game in our main specification is a global game with common
values and private correlated signals. Morris and Shin (2003) survey the applied literature
using global games approach in finance and macroeconomics. The games used to study
models of bank runs, currency crises and herding behavior all feature strategic comple-
2Gilbert and Riordan (2007) and Besanko, Doraszelski and Kryukov (2014) examine different solutions
to reduce the number of equilibria.
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mentarities. Global games with strategic substitution like the one studied in this paper
have been the subject of much fewer studies. Applications of global games to industrial
organization is still scarce and the only existing work that we are aware are Argenziano
(2008) and Julien and Pavan (2016).
Carlsson and van Damme (1993), hereafter CvD, show for the case of 2 × 2 games
that if there are strictly dominant regions associated to each possible action , then if there
are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in the underlying complete information game, for
sufficiently small noise iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies selects a unique
equilibrium, which is the Harsanyi and Selten (1988) risk dominant equilibrium.3 Some
assumptions used in the main theorem in CvD are not satisfied in our main specification4,
which motivates our approach for a tailored proof.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple ex-
ample of a quality upgrade game and its link to global games to introduce the problem
studied in the paper. Section 3 presents the model and equilibrium analysis under different
information structures. Section 4 concludes. Some of the proofs and detailed computations
are contained in the Appendix.
3.1 Illustrative Example
The purpose of this Section is to provide a simple example of a model of quality upgrade
and global game. Let g (Γ) be the 2x2 game depicted in Figure 1 and consider the class of
games {g (Γ)}Γ∈R.
3See footnote 5 for explanation of risk dominant equilibrium.
4More specifically, Assumption 1 in CvD requires the payoffs to be of class C1, which is not the case
in our model. Assumption 4 in CvD consider the support of the noise to be bounded. This assumption




q2 = 0 q2 = 1
Firm 1
q1 = 0 1, 1 0, Γ
q1 = 1 Γ, 0 Γ− c , Γ− c
Figure 3.1: Simple quality upgrade game.
The individual payoff is normalized to one when both firms decide not to upgrade their
products, Γ when the firm upgrades alone and Γ−c when both firms upgrade. We interpret
Γ as the monopoly profit generated when the firm invests in quality upgrade and c ∈ (0, 1)
as the discount in the profit that comes from competition when both firms are upgrading.
In the complete information game, invest ((q1, q2) = (1, 1)) is a dominant strategy for
both firms when Γ > 1. If Γ < c, then not invest ((q1, q2) = (0, 0)) is dominant. For values
of Γ between c and 1, there will be two pure strategy Nash equilibria and one equilibrium
in mixed strategies.
Now consider the incomplete information game, in which each firm will observe the
realized game with some noise and then chooses whether or not to invest in quality upgrade.
More specifically, assume that the fundamental parameter Γ is normally distributed with
mean µ and variance σ2Γ. We interpret the distribution of Γ as uncertainty about the success
of quality improvement. Moreover, firms do not observe Γ directly and instead, each firm
receives a signal xi = Γ + εi, where εi ∼ N (0, σ2ε) with ε1 and ε2 independent of each






. This model is a global game with private correlated signals and common values
(Carlsson and van Damme (1994)).5
5In Appendix B we show a similar model with private correlated values.
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This game features both fundamental uncertainty (Γ is not known) and strategic un-
certainty (a firm does not know the opponent’s action). Similarly to the game of complete
information, if the signals are precise about the realization of Γ (i.e., σ2ε is low), high signals
will induce firms to invest as a dominant strategy and low signals will lead not to invest.
We start by considering equilibria with cutoff strategies, in which there is a threshold xi
below which firm i will not invest and above which the firm will invest.
The expected payoff to Firm 1 from not investing is Pr (x2 ≤ x2|x1). When investing,
the expected payoff to Firm 1 is
E [Γ|x1]− c [1− Pr (x2 ≤ x2|x1)]
where
E [Γ|x1] = ρx1 + (1− ρ)µ
and
Pr (x2 ≤ x2|x1) = Φ






Firm 1 is indifferent between investing or not if
ρx1 + (1− ρ)µ− c− (1− c) Φ






The left hand side will be negative for x1 sufficiently low and positive tor x1 sufficiently
high. Hence, for any x2, existence of x1 satisfying this indifference condition is guaranteed
from continuity of the left hand side.
If x2 → ∞, this indifference condition becomes xU1 =
1−(1−ρ)µ
ρ




, where it is straightforward to see that xU1 > x
L
1 . The slope of the best
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The condition for uniqueness in this case requires that the slope of the best response
b1 (x2) is smaller than 1, i.e, the best response b1 (x2) crosses the 45











Figure 3.2: Combinations of (ρ, σΓ) satisfying uniqueness condition for different values of
σΓ for the symmetric model (Figure (a)) and asymmetric model (Figure (b)). Shaded area
represents the uniqueness region for the case of c = 0.25.
Condition (3.1.1) states that in this simple duopoly model of quality competition, equi-
librium product improvement decisions are unique if and only if market uncertainty (mea-
sured by σΓ) is sufficiently high relative to strategic uncertainty (measured by ρ). If equi-
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librium is unique, because of the symmetry of the game, we must have that x1 = x2 = x.
If we rewrite the indifference condition in this case we have that











The limit case for ρ → 1 is x = 1+c
2
. This threshold value coincides with the value that
separates the two regions of risk dominance6 (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)): invest is risk
dominant if Γ > 1+c
2
and not invest is risk dominant if Γ < 1+c
2
.
3.2 Information structure and product improvement
The previous Section illustrates the use of global games using a simple game of quality
upgrade. The simplicity of the payoff structure carries one inconvenient implication: even
the monopolistic payoff can be unboundedly negative. Another aspect that is noteworthy
in the simplified example is the resulting strategic complementarity: greater opposing ac-
tion make greater actions more appealing. When we deal with cases of limited consumer







We say that strategy pair (G, G) risk dominates (H, H) if the product of the deviation losses is highest
for (G, G) (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988, Lemma 5.4.4), i.e., if the following inequality holds:
(C–D)(c–d) ≥ (B–A)(b–a).
In our application, we say that strategy profile (q1, q2) = (0, 0) risk dominates (q1, q2) = (1, 1) if
(1− Γ)2 > (Γ− c)2 ,
which holds for Γ < 1+c2 . When Γ >
1+c
2 , (q1, q2) = (1, 1) risk dominates (q1, q2) = (0, 0).
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heterogeneity, the winner-take-all nature of these markets is more conveniently modeled
as a game of strategic substitution. The specification developed in this Section deals with
these two aspects.
3.2.1 Market structure
Consider a market with two symmetric firms, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. Firm i decides whether
to improve its product by choosing qi ∈ {0, 1}. The realized profit of Firm 1 is
π1 (q1, q2) = max {0, q1 − q2 + Γ} − rq1, (3.2.1)
and the profit of Firm 2 is
π2 (q1, q2) = max {0, q2 − q1 − Γ} − rq2. (3.2.2)
The parameter r ∈ (0, 1) is the cost of investment in high quality, and Γ ∈ R is an exogenous
advantage of Firm 1.
We offer two interpretations of these profit functions. One interpretation that two
upstream firms are competing to supply component input to a downstream customer, and
can invest in design improvement prior to price competition. The customer has a gross
value of γi + qi for Firm i’s design, and Γ = γ1 − γ2 is Firm 1’s advantage over Firm 2.
The upstream firms offer prices pi, and customer selects the component with a higher net
value. If Γ = γ1 − γ2, then the profit functions describe equilibrium profits for alternative
investment configurations. A second interpretation is that the two firms are posting prices
to sell a final product in a consumer market with limited preference diversity. Suppose, for
example, that a type θ consumer enjoys utility (1 + θ)Q− P from consuming a quality Q
product at price P , and chooses whichever product offers a higher utility. If the consumer
population is distributed exponentially i.e. θ ∼ F (θ) ≡ 1 − e−λθ with λ ≥ 1, then the
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Bertrand price equilibrium yields a corner solution, in which the higher quality firm sets
its price equal to the quality difference, and the rival firm sets its price to zero. According
to this interpretation the quality difference between Firm 1 and Firm 2 is q1 − q2 + Γ. 7
Given the reduced form profit functions, we model duopoly product improvement as
a Bayesian game with the following timing. At Stage 1, Nature chooses a realization of
Γ ∼ N (0, σ2Γ). At Stage 2, the firms privately observe signals xi = Γ + σεεi, with σε > 0
and ε1, ε2
iid∼ N (0, 1), and then simultaneously choose qi. A (pure) strategy for Firm i is a
function qi : R → {0, 1}, which defines a product improvement decision for each possible
realization of xi. At Stage 3, the firms earn profits as function of Γ and (q1, q2). The limiting
cases of perfectly informative signals (full information) and completely noisy signals (no
information) are two benchmark models. In the full information model, both firms observe
Γ at the beginning of stage two prior to product improvement decisions. In the imperfect
information model, neither firm learns about Γ until Stage 3 when profits are realized. Our
main interest, however, is the intermediate Bayesian model, in which firms base product
improvement decision on noisy and correlated signals about brand advantage.
3.2.2 Full information model
The full information limiting case generates a class of games indexed by Γ, {g (Γ)}Γ∈R, with
the following form:
The full-information model has either a unique dominant strategy equilibrium, or three
Nash equilibria, depending on r and Γ. The following proposition characterizes these
equilibria when Firm 1 has the advantage (Γ ≥ 0). The opposite case is symmetric, with
the firms switching roles.
7Details are in Appendix A. While the exponential distribution simplifies the computation of equilibrium




q2 = 0 q2 = 1
Firm 1
q1 = 0 max {Γ, 0}, max {−Γ, 0} max {Γ− 1, 0}, max {1− Γ, 0} − r
q1 = 1 max {1 + Γ, 0} − r, max {−1− Γ, 0} max {Γ, 0} − r, max {−Γ, 0} − r
Figure 3.3: Full-information payoff matrix
Proposition 8. In the full-information model with Γ ≥ 0: (1) If Γ > r, then the unique
dominant strategy equilibrium is for Firm 1 to choose q1 = 1 and for Firm 2 to choose
q2 = 0. (2) If Γ ≤ r, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria, and a strictly mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium. In a pure strategy equilibrium only one of the two firms chooses
product improvement. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, Firm 1 improves its product with
probability 1−Γ−r
1−Γ , and Firm 2 improves its product with probability
1−r
1−Γ .
Proof. When Γ > r, Firm 1 will have q = 1 as a dominant strategy and Firm 2 will have
q = 0 as a dominant strategy, proving (1). To show (2) note that if 0 ≤ Γ ≤ r, Firms are
playing best responses to each other only when they choose different quality levels; hence
the two pure strategy Nash equilibria: (I,NI) and (NI, I). In order to characterize a
mixed strategy equilibrium, let α = Prob (q1 = 1) and β = Prob (q2 = 1). The value of β
that makes Firm 1 indifferent between investing or not is β = 1−r
1−Γ . For β < β, Firm 1 plays
q1 = 1 and for β > β, Firm 1 plays q1 = 0. The value of α that makes Firm 2 indifferent
is α = 1−r−Γ
1−Γ . For α < α, Firm 2 plays q2 = 1 and for α > α, Firm 2 plays q2 = 0.
The multiplicity of equilibria for 0 ≤ Γ ≤ r is troubling on two counts. In the pure
strategy equilibria, the two firms earn very different profits even if the exogenous quality
difference is arbitrarily small. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, while expected profits
are continuous in Γ, coordination failure results either in wasteful investment or failure to


























































Figure 3.4: No-information payoff matrix
3.2.3 No information
A valid criticism of the full information model is that competitors may be unsure of who
has the advantage and of how large is the advantage. To address this criticism, assume it is
common knowledge that Γ ∼ N (0, σ2Γ), and that the firms receive no additional information
prior to investment. The payoffs of the game are now the corresponding expected values
of payoffs of the full information game. Using that8











where φ (.) and Φ (.) respectively denote the standard normal density function and cumu-
lative distribution function, we have the following matrix of expected payoffs:
Our characterization of the equilibrium set of this game uses the following definition:













Lemma 9. For s > 0 , r (s) is decreasing and bounded between 1/2 and 1, and r (s) >
1− r (s).
8See proof in the appendix.
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Finally, r (s) decreasing and Lims→+∞r (s) =
1
2
implies that r (s) > 1
2
, i.e. r (s) > 1−r (s).
The next proposition characterizes the equilibria of the game without information. The
equilibrium is unique when the cost of product improvement is sufficiently high or suffi-
ciently low. However, in those cases equilibrium will reflect a coordination problem with
wasteful investment (when r is low) or failure to improve (when r is high). For intermediary
values of r there will be two pure strategy equilibria with only one firm investing in product
improvement and also one strictly mixed strategy.
Proposition 10. In the no-information model: (1) There exists a unique equilibrium in
which neither firm improves its product if and only if r > r (σΓ). (2) There exists a unique
equilibrium in which both firms improve their products if and only if r < 1 − r (σΓ). (3)
There exist two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria in which only one firm improves its
product if and only if r (σΓ) ≥ r ≥ 1− r (σΓ). (4) There exists a symmetric strictly mixed
strategy equilibrium, in which each firm improves its product with probability r(σΓ)−r
2r(σΓ)−1
, if
and only if r (σΓ) > r > 1− r (σΓ).
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Proof. First, consider dominant strategy equilibria. It is straightforward to check that














or equivalently r ≥ r (σΓ), and a best response if to q2 = 1 if and only if r ≥ 1 − r (σΓ).
Therefore, by symmetry (q1, q2) = (0, 0) is a dominant strategy equilibrium if and only if
r ≥ r (σΓ). Furthermore, q1 = 0 is a strictly dominant strategy if the inequality is strict.
Similarly, (q1, q2) = (1, 1), is a dominant strategy equilibrium if and only if r ≤ 1− r (σΓ),
and a unique equilibrium if the inequality is strict. Second, (q1, q2) = (1, 0) or (q1, q2) =
























− 1 ≥ σΓ√
2π
− r
both hold. These inequalities are equivalent to r (σΓ) ≥ r ≥ 1−r (σΓ). Finally, consider the
possibility of a mixed strategy equilibrium. Let β = Prob (q2 = 1). The expected payoff of
Firm 1 when playing q1 = 0 is
(1− β)E [max {Γ, 0}] + βE [max {Γ− 1, 0}] = σΓ√
2π
+ βr (σΓ)− β,
and the expected payoff of Firm 1 when playing q1 = 1 is
(1− β)E [max {1 + Γ, 0}] + βE [max {Γ, 0}]− r = r (σΓ) +
σΓ√
2π
− βr (σΓ)− r.
Therefore, the value of β that makes Firm 1 indifferent between investing or not is
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which is strictly between 0 and 1 for investment cost satisfying r (σΓ) > r > 1− r (σΓ).
Proposition 2 fully characterizes all equilibria, as illustrated in the next figure.
Figure 3.5: Functions r (σΓ) , 1− r (σΓ) and characterization of regions of pure and mixed
equilibria. The gray area, within r (σΓ) and 1 − r (σΓ), consists of all combinations of r
and σΓ for which we have two pure (asymmetric) equilibria (q1, q2) = (1, 0) and (q1, q2) =
(0, 1) as well as a strictly mixed equilibrium, characterized in Proposition 2. The region
above r (σΓ) has a unique pure equilibrium in which none of the firms invest in quality
improvement. Finally, the region below 1 − r (σΓ) characterizes all combinations of r
and σΓ for which there is a unique pure equilibrium with both firms investing in quality
improvement.
Notice that r = 1/2 is a special case for which multiple equilibria always exist, even as
σΓ grows large. The reason is that, as σΓ grows large, the probability of “winning” converges
to 1/2 independently of product improvement. Consequently, for r > 1/2, the expected
return to product improvement is negative if market uncertainty is sufficiently great, and,
conversely, for r < 1/2, the expected return to product improvement is positive. For




We return to our main model in which the firms base their product improvement decisions
on noisy information about brand advantage. In the noisy-information model, firms share
a common prior belief, Γ ∼ N (0, σ2Γ). and observe private signals xi = Γ + σεεi with
ε1, ε2
iid∼ N (0, 1) and σε > 0. The pair of signals (x1, x2) are correlated through the common
component Γ. The correlation coefficient is ρ ≡ σ2Γ/ (σ2ε + σ2Γ). We will parameterize the
information structure by (σΓ, ρ), interpreting σΓ as a measure of market uncertainty, and ρ
as a measure of strategic uncertainty. The full-information and no-information benchmarks
correspond respectively to ρ = 1 and ρ = 0.











, and the distribution of Γ condi-











A (pure) strategy for Firm i is a function qi : R→ {0, 1}, which defines a quality decision
for each possible realization of xi. The product improvement game proceeds as follows.
Firms privately observe their signals, decide product improvement investments, and then
learn the value of Γ. After that, the higher quality firm earns a profit equal to the realized
total quality difference. Letting
Π1 (Γ, q1, q2) ≡ max {Γ + q1 − q2, 0}
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denote the realized profit of Firm 1, and Π2 (Γ, q2, q1) ≡ Π1 (−Γ, q2, q1) the realized profit
of Firm 2, a Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is a strategy profile [q1 (x1) , q2 (x2)] such that
qi (xi) ∈ arg max
qi
E [Πi (Γ, qi, q−i(x−i)) |xi]
for all xi, for i = 1, 2. The equilibrium concept captures the interplay of market uncer-
tainty and strategic uncertainty in that equilibrium beliefs about Γ and q−i(x−i) are jointly
determined by the Firm i’s signal xi.
3.2.4.3 Threshold equilibrium
A natural strategy is for a firm to invest in product improvement if and only if its infor-
mation about expected returns is sufficiently favorable. The firms have opposing interests:
a high value of x1 is good news for Firm 1, while a low value of x2 is good news for Firm
2. Therefore, a natural candidate for equilibrium is a a strategy profile defined by a pair
of critical values (x̄1, x̄2) such that
q1 (x1) =

1 if x1 ≥ x̄1
0 if x1 < x̄1
and q2 (x2) =

1 if x2 ≤ x̄2
0 if x2 > x̄2
.
That is, each firm follows a “threshold strategy” defined by a critical value of a signal for
product improvement. The following proposition lays the foundation for consideration of
such a “threshold equilibrium”.
Proposition 11. A threshold strategy is a best response to a threshold strategy.
Proof. We show that Firm 1 optimally uses a threshold strategy if Firm 2 uses a threshold
strategy; the converse is proved similarly. Suppose Firm 2 follows a threshold strategy,
q2 (x2), defined by a critical value x2 such that Firm 2 invests only if x2 < x2. Firm 1’s
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expected payoff conditional on observing x1 is
Π (q1, x1;x2) ≡ E [max {q1 + Γ− q2 (x2) , 0} |x1]
and the expected return from investing is
∆ (x1;x2) ≡ Π (1, x1;x2)− Π (0, x1;x2) .
5Let F (x2|Γ) = F (x2|Γ, x1) denote the cumulative distribution function for x2 given Γ, and
let G (Γ|x1) denote the distribution of Γ given x1. These conditional normal distributions
satisfy first-order stochastic dominance. Since



















ΓF (x2|Γ) dG (Γ|x1) +
ˆ +∞
−1
(1 + Γ) [1− F (x2|Γ)] dG (Γ|x1)
and



















(Γ− 1)F (x2|Γ) dG (Γ|x1) +
ˆ +∞
0




δ (Γ, x2) dG (Γ|x1) ,
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with
δ (Γ, x2) =

0 Γ ≤ −1
(1 + Γ) [1− F (x2|Γ)] if −1 < Γ ≤ 0
1− (1− Γ)F (x2|Γ) 0 < Γ ≤ 1
1 Γ ≥ 1
δ (Γ, x2) is the expected return from investing (gross of investment cost) conditional on
(Γ, x1), given Firm 2’s threshold strategy. Since δ (Γ, x2) is increasing in Γ, the first-order
stochastic dominance implies ∆ (x1;x2) is increasing in x1. Furthermore,
lim
x1→+∞




∆ (x1;x2) = 0
imply that ∆ (x1;x2) = r has a unique interior solution if 0 < r < 1. This solution defines
a best response threshold strategy for Firm 1, i.e. Firm 1 invests only if x1 > x1.
Equilibrium threshold strategies are determined by symmetric indifference conditions for
x1 and x2: ∆ (x1;x2) = r and ∆ (−x2;−x1) = r. Solution defines a best response for Firm 1:
x1 = b1 (x2) ≡ b(x2). By symmetry the best response for Firm 2 is x2 = b2 (x1) ≡ −b(−x1).
It follows that x1 = b(−b(−x1)) ≡ B(x1) at equilibrium.
The following proposition motivates consideration of conditions for a unique threshold
equilibrium that is symmetric and stable. Symmetry requires that x̄1 = −x̄2 at equilibrium,
i.e. Firm 1’s best response curve crosses the negative diagonal in R2, and stability requires
that it crosses from above. Figure 2 illustrates a unique, symmetric, and stable equilib-
rium for the parameter configuration with a standardized degree of market uncertainty, a
relatively low degree of strategic uncertainty, and several values of of the cost of product
105
improvement.
Figure 3.6: Best responses for Firm 1 (solid) and Firm 2 (dashed) for the case of σΓ = 1,
ρ = 0.9 and r ∈ {0.4, 0.5, 0.6}. All cases generate a unique equilibrium.
The proposition states that a unique and stable threshold equilibrium is sufficient for a
unique dominance solvable BNE.
Proposition 12. If there is a unique stable equilibrium in threshold strategies, then no
other equilibrium survives the iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
Proof. The best response functions b1 (x2) and b2 (x1) are continuous, strictly increasing,
and bounded above and below. Assume (x∗1, x
∗
2) uniquely satisfy x
∗







1). By stability, b2 (x1) < b
−1
1 (x1) for b1 (+∞) > x1 > x∗1, and b2 (x1) > b−11 (x1) for





. Given xk2 > x
∗









in any equilibrium that survives the iterated elimination of iterated strategies, Firm 2 does
not invest if x2 > x
∗
2. A similar argument starting at x
1
2 = b2 (−∞) implies that Firm 2
does not invest if x2 < x
∗
2. Therefore, in any equilibrium surviving the iterative elimination
of dominated strategies, Firm 2 uses a threshold strategy. By the Monotonicity Lemma,
Firm 1 responds with a threshold strategy. Therefore, if (x∗1, x
∗
2) is a unique threshold
equilibrium and threshold best replies satisfy the stability property, then there is no other
equilibrium.
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Multiple threshold equilibria cannot be ruled out in general. Figure 3 illustrates multiple
intersections of response curves for a lower value of ρ compared to the case in Figure 2.
Now there is an unstable symmetric equilibrium, and two stable asymmetric equilibria.
The comparison suggests the conjecture that a unique equilibrium exists if ρis sufficiently
high, i.e. strategic uncertainty is sufficiently low.
Figure 3.7: Best responses for Firm 1 (solid) and Firm 2 (dashed) for the case of σΓ = 1,
ρ = 0.1 and different values of r. All cases have 3 threshold equilibria.
3.2.4.4 Special case: r = 1/2
Multiple equilibria are intrinsic in the no-information model for the r = 1/2 special case.
The multiplicity problem, however, vanishes if firms have a sufficiently small amount of
noisy information, i.e. strategic uncertainty is great. In this case threshold strategy best
response curves cross only once in the neighborhood of the origin. In the limit the unique
equilibrium is a threshold strategy profile with (x1, x2) = (0, 0).
Proposition 13. For r = 1/2 and ρ sufficiently close to 1, there exists a unique and stable
threshold equilibrium.
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0 if x1 < x2
1+x1
2
if x1 = x2
1 + x1 if x1 > x2
.





x1 if x1 < x2
1+x1
2
if x1 = x2
1 if x1 > x2
.
For 0 < ρ < 1, ∆(x1; x̄2) is continuously increasing in x1, even though it is discontinuous at
the limit as ρ → 1. Consequently, given r = 1/2, if x2 > 0, then 1+x22 > r and b (x2) ≤ x2
for ρ sufficiently close to 1; x2 < 0, then similarly implies that b (x2) ≥ x2 . Therefore,
b(0) = 0 is the unique and stable intersection of best response curves for ρ close to 1.
This uniqueness result for r = 1/2 is striking, because multiple equilibria always exist in
the no-information model for this case. The multiplicity problem is resolved by introducing
an arbitrarily small amount of private information about market conditions, consistent with
the global game literature.
Proposition 14. For any given σΓ and r = 1/2, if equilibrium is unique for ρ, then it is
also unique for any ρ > ρ.
Proof. The proof is organized in 3 steps. Some properties are proved numerically whenever
the analytical results are not tractable.
Step 1: If r = 1/2, b1 (0) = 0.
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To prove this it suffices to show that ∆ (0, 0) = 1
2
.




















































































































Step 2: For r = 1/2, b1 (x2) is concave when x2 > 0 and convex when x2 < 0.
Step 3: If b′1 (0) < 1 for ρ, then b
′
1 (0) < 1 for every ρ > ρ. In order to prove this result






























































which, for any σΓ > 0, is concave in ρ and converges to 1 as ρ→ 1. Hence, if b′1 (0) < 1 for
ρ, then b′1 (0) < 1 for every ρ > ρ.
We study the (nonempty) set
H−1 = {(x1, x2, ρ, σΓ, r) |H (x1, x2; ρ, σΓ, r) = 0, ρ ∈ (0, 1) , σΓ > 0, r ∈ (0, 1)} ,
where H (.) is the system of equations that characterizes the threshold equilibria, which
depends on the parameters ρ, σΓ and r. The goal is to explore whether this set is a singleton
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or not, which will characterize the regions of uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibria. In
principle we could try the approach suggested by Besanko et al (2010) and Doraszelski and
Pakes (2007) and use the homotopy algorithm to search for all equilibria. Instead, since
the goal is to characterize the uniqueness region and not search for all equilibria, we use a
simpler approach relying on the fact that the slope of the best response for Firm 1 should
be greater than one under multiplicity and smaller than one under uniqueness. The graphic
describing the uniqueness and multiplicity regions of H−1 as a function of the parameters
is a surface. In Figures 5 and 6 we explore this graphic by taking slices of it for different
values of σΓ.
The range of ρ for which equilibrium is unique depends on the degree ex ante market
uncertainty, as shown in Figure 4. Equilibrium is unique if either ρ is sufficiently small, or
if σΓ is sufficiently large. Note that the boundary between the uniqueness region and the
multiplicity region is very steep near the extreme case of no-information (ρ = 0) and full-
information (ρ = 1). For intermediate cases of strategic uncertainty, a substantial amount
of market uncertainty is necessary for unique equilibria.
Figure 3.8: Combinations of (ρ, σΓ) satisfying uniqueness condition for r = 1/2.
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3.2.4.5 Uniqueness more generally
Numerical analysis confirms that uniqueness is obtained for a larger range of (ρ, σΓ) beyond
the r = 1/2 special case. Figure 7 characterizes the uniqueness region in the (ρ, r) space
for various values of σΓ. The solid line is the critical threshold above which there exists
a unique and stable threshold equilibrium. There are multiple threshold equilibria in the
parameter range below the threshold. For lower (higher) values of σΓ, the critical threshold
shifts down (up). The multiplicity region shrinks as σΓ grows large. Uniqueness can be
reached either through enough correlation (i.e., ρ sufficiently high, but ρ < 1) or variance
σ2Γ sufficiently high. In Figures 4 and 5 we illustrate this by fixing σΓ = 1 and increasing the
correlation from ρ = 0.1 (case of multiple equilibria) to ρ = 0.9 (case of unique equilibrium).
Figure 3.9: Combinations of (r, ρ) satisfying uniqueness condition for different values of σΓ.
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3.2.5 Miscoordination
Miscoordination in the current setup happens whenever both firms take the same action.
In the case with no information, the probability that both firms will take the same action
will increase to 1 as σΓ grows, except in the non-generic case where r = 1/2. For the
complete information case, miscoordination happens only under mixed strategies, which
requires |Γ| < r. Figure 8 describes the probability of miscoordination for the complete
information case when r = 1/2.
Figure 3.10: Probability of miscoordination in the complete information case as a function
of Γ for r = 1
2
.
3.2.5.1 “Ex-ante” Probability of Miscoordination
We call “ex-ante probability” the case that considers the distribution of Γ, as opposed to
a given realization of Γ, to be discussed in the next subsection. The “ex ante” probability
of miscoordination is












f (x1, x2) dx1dx2. (3.2.3)
Since x1, x2 ∼ N (0, σ2Γ + σ2ε ) with corr (x1, x2) = ρ, the joint density f (x1, x2) is given by
f (x1, x2) =
1


















The next figure illustrates how the ex-ante probability of miscoordination varies for different
combinations of σ2Γ and ρ. One interesting take away from this figure is that ρ close
to one, which is a condition that guarantees uniqueness, also reduces the probability of
miscoordination to nearly zero.
Figure 3.11: “Ex-ante” probability of miscoordination for different combinations of (σ2Γ, ρ)
and r = 1
2
.
3.2.5.2 “Ex-post” Probability of Miscoordination
Now we consider the probability of miscoordination given a realization of Γ. This “ex-post”
probability of miscoordination is the probability that both firms take the same action for any
given realization of Γ. Since x1, x2|Γ


























f (x1, x2|Γ) dx1dx2 (3.2.4)
The next figure illustrates how the ex-post probability of miscoordination varies for different
combinations of σ2ε and Γ.
Figure 3.12: “Ex-post” probability of miscoordination for different combinations of (σ2ε ,Γ)
and r = 1
2
.
We see from Figure 10 that, for any Γ, the ex-post probability of miscoordination van-
ished as σε → 0. It is useful to compare this probability with the benchmark complete
information model, which we do in Figure 11. There, the orange surface represents the
probability of miscoordination in the complete information game minus the ex-post proba-
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bility of miscoordination for different combinations of (σ2ε ,Γ) and r =
1
2
. The zero plane is
represented in blue. We see that the probability of miscoordination in the complete infor-
mation game strictly dominates the ex-post probability of miscoordination, except when Γ
is close to 0.5 and σ2ε is not too close to zero.
Figure 3.13: Probability of miscoordination in the complete information game minus the
ex-post probability of miscoordination (orange) for r = 1
2
. The zero plane is represented in
blue.
3.3 Conclusion
We have examined the interplay between information and actions in a duopoly game of
quality upgrade. The underlying consumer market that motivates our payoff structure
exhibits limited heterogeneity, resulting in a winner-take-all market. The resulting quality
upgrade game is a (anti) coordination game of strategic substitution.
In the complete information version of the game, there are two pure strategy Nash
equilibria and one equilibrium in mixed strategies. Uniqueness of equilibria can be reached
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by introducing uncertainty about the realization of the fundamental Γ. However, if firms
have common knowledge of the game played and do not receive any additional information
about the realization of Γ, the uniqueness region will feature miscoordination in invest-
ments with probability one. In these cases, not only the loser will have negative profits
in the equilibrium in which both firms upgrade their products, but also there is a positive
probability that the winning firm will also have negative profits. This result comes from
the fact that in equilibrium prices are proportional to the quality differences, which in the
unique equilibrium in the “no information” case is determined only by Γ since actions of
both firms are the same.
With strategic uncertainty, each firm is uncertain as to what the other firm will do. In
the type of competition studied here, firms have no incentive to choose the same quality
as the competition arising in the marketplace would bring prices to equalize marginal cost.
Actions will then depend on what each firm believes the opponent will do. When we
introduce private and correlated signals about the fundamental uncertainty, each firm can
form a more educated guess about what the opponent must be doing, which is the key for
uniqueness of equilibria. Interestingly, this information structure alleviates substantially
the problem of miscoordination observed in the no “information game” and also dominates
the complete information game for a large range of parameters in the model.
Our analysis presumes that firms make their decisions simultaneously and in one single
period. When these decisions are taken over time, early investments of one firm can preempt
the competitor from upgrading in the future. Extending the model to a dynamic framework
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
The next figure brings a portion of the exclusivity contract of a major distributor
mentioning how wholesale prices are determined. I translate the text below (my italics):
(b) Prices - the [wholesale] price of products and lubricants will be the one listed in
the invoice, freely agreed between the parties, except for the products which prices still are
or come to be regulated by the public authority, and in force at the delivery date. The
[wholesale] prices will include taxes applicable according to the current legislation, including
those related to tax substitution, whenever that is the case.




Appendix to Chapter 2
In this appendix we consider the case of an unsponsored network. Suppose the price of
the network is fixed at pt in period t. We are interested in the equilibrium with monotone
strategies: if a consumer with signal xi choose to join the network at period n, then all
consumers with xi′ > xi join at period t
′ ≤ t. Any monotone strategy of the consumers
can be characterized by the sequence of cutoffs x̄1 and x̄2 (x̄1 ≥ x̄2) where the remaining
consumers at period t join the network if and only if xi ≥ x̄t.
Second Period If a consumer does not join the network in the first period, her problem
in the second period is to decide between joining the network or not, in which case she will
get zero utility. Solving backwards, we know that consumer i will join the network in the
second period if
Ui,2 = E [vi + α (n1 + n2) |xi, θ]− p2 ≥ 0.
For any given any monotone strategy (x̄1, x̄2), The mass of consumers joining the net-
work in each period is given by



















Since n1 is publicly observed, the fundamental θ is perfectly known in the second period.
Therefore
Ui,2 = E [vi|xi, θ] + αN1(x̄1, θ) + αN2(x̄1, x̄2, θ)− p2
= E [θ + hi|xi, θ] + αN1(x̄1, θ) + αN2(x̄1, x̄2, θ)− p2
= θ + E [hi|ηi] + αN1(x̄1, θ) + αN2(x̄1, x̄2, θ)− p2
= (1− τ)θ + τxi + αN1(x̄1, θ) + αN2(x̄1, x̄2, θ)− p2,
since hi|ηi ∼ N (τηi, (1− τ)σ2h) and ηi = xi − θ.
Let’s first consider the equilibrium where x̄2 < x̄1, that is, positive measure of consumers
join the network in the second period. In this case, consumer x̄2 must be indifferent between
buying and not buying since Ui,2 is continuous in xi. Therefore, his indifference condition
in the second period is given by
(1− τ)θ + τ x̄2 + αN1(x̄1, θ) + αN2(x̄1, x̄2, θ) = p2. (B.0.1)
Let x̂2(x̄1, θ) be the solution of (B.0.1). This condition will characterize the second period
threshold whenever x̂2(x̄1, θ) < x1. If x̂2(x̄1, θ) ≥ x1, all consumers who waited in the
first period are better off not buying the product, hence x2 = x1. This corresponds to the
situation in which no consumer will join the platform in the second period for the given
realization of θ and the price charged by the existing platform, p2. Therefore, the cutoff
function x2 (p2; x̄1, θ) is defined as
x2 (x̄1, θ) = min{x̄1, x̂2 (x̄1, θ)}.
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A unique threshold in the second period relies on enough consumer heterogeneity in






This assumption will be satisfied under sufficiently large heterogeneity or a mild con-
temporaneous network externality in the second period.
Proposition 16. Suppose Assumption 15 holds. Then given any x̄1 and θ, x̄2 is uniquely
determined for any p2. Moreover, x̄2 is nondecreasing in p2.
Proof. Given x̄1, θ and p2 ≥ c, all terms in (B.0.1) are bounded, except for x2. Then,
(1− τ)θ + τx2 + αN1 + αN2(x2)− p2
will be negative for sufficiently negative values of x2 and will be positive for sufficiently high
values of x2. Since this function is continuous in x2, Intermediate Value Theorem implies
that there exists a solution to (B.0.1). Uniqueness is obtained by showing monotonicity of
the left-hand side of (B.0.1):
∂(LHS)
∂x2
= τ − α
σh






which is strictly positive under Assumption 15, completing the proof of uniqueness. Mono-
tonicity also follows.
Define θ(x̄1) be the solution of the equation






Note that θ(x̄1) is uniquely defined, and under Assumption 15 θ(x̄1) is decreasing in x̄1.
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Then (2.3.1) implies that
x2 (x̄1, θ) =

x̂2 (x̄1, θ) if θ > θ(x̄1)
x̄1 if θ ≤ θ(x̄1).
First Period Now we consider the equilibrium behavior in the first period given the
function x̄2(x̄1, θ). In the first period, consumer i receives a signal xi, observes the first-
period price p1, and then chooses whether to join the network. Consider the monotone
strategy in which consumers join the network if and only if xi ≥ x̄1. If consumer xi joins
the network in the first period, his expected payoff is
Eθ[vi|xi] + Eθ [αN1(x1) + αN2(x1, x2(x1, θ), θ)|xi]− p1.
On the other hand, if he delays the purchase, his payoff is discounted by δ but he has the
option to purchase or not in the second period. In this case, his expected payoff is given
by
δ · Eθ [max {0, (1− τ)θ + τxi + αN1(x1) + αN2(x1, x2(x1, θ), θ)− p2} |xi] ,
or
δ Pr θ(x̄2(x̄1, θ) < xi|xi) {(1− τ)θ + τxi + Eθ [αN1 + αN2 − p2|xi,x̄2(x̄1, θ) < x̄i]} ,
since consumer i joins the network in the second period if and only if xi ≥ x̄2(x̄1, θ). The
consumer whose intrinsic value equals the first-period cutoff x̄1 must be indifferent between
joining the network and delaying the purchase. Therefore, his indifference condition is given
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by
Eθ[vi|xi] + αEθ [N1 +N2|x̄1]− p1
= δ Pr θ(x̄2 < x̄1|x̄1) {(1− τ)θ + τ x̄1 + Eθ [αN1 + αN2 − p2|x̄1, x̄2 < x̄1]}
Since (2.3.1) holds whenever x̄2(x̄1, θ) < x̄1, we have
Eθ[vi|xi] + Eθ [αN1 + αN2|x̄1]− p1 = δ Pr θ(x̄2 < x̄1|x̄1)τ {x̄1 − Eθ [x̄2|x̄1, x̄2 < x̄1]} .
We have shown that x2 < x̄1 if θ > θ, and x2 = x̄1 otherwise, with θ defined in (2.3.2).
The indifference condition can then be rewritten as






N̄1 (x1) = Eθ [Φ (γ(x̄1)) |x1] = Φ ((µ− x1) z1) ,














θ − x̄2(x̄1, θ)
σh
)
f (θ|x1) dθ − N̄1 (x1) ,
Q̄ (x1) = Pr [x̄2(x̄1, θ) = x̄1|x1] = Pr [θ ≤ θ|x1] ,













Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Consumer market
The following duopoly model illustrates how limited consumer heterogeneity results in a
winner-take-all market. A type θ consumer enjoys net utility (1+θ)Q−P from consuming a
good of quality Q at price P , and the population of consumers is distributed exponentially,
i.e. θ ∼ F (θ) = 1− e−λθ.
There are two firms, i ∈ {1, 2}, with given qualities Q1 > Q2, who set prices Pi in
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. At an interior solution, such that the firms share the market,





Firm 1 maximizes P1e






















At P2 = 0 and P1 =
Q1−Q2
λ
, the left-hand side of Firm 2’s first-order condition is equal
to 1 − e−(1−λ), which is positive if λ < 1. Therefore P2 > 0 is a best response if λ < 1,
and the two firms share the market. If λ ≥ 1, then an interior solution fails to exist. The
equilibrium is a corner solution in which Firm 1 sets P1 = Q1 − Q2, Firm 2 sets P2 = 0,
and Firm 1 wins the entire market.
In case of an interior solution, the first-order conditions combine and imply that the
condition defining the marginal consumer becomes
eλθ̂ + λ(1 + θ̂) = 2.
Remarkably, the marginal consumer, and therefore market shares, depend only on λ. Con-















Clearly, there is an incentive for maximum quality differentiation. The issue is how do
firms coordinate on quality. It is interesting that Firm 2 earns greater profit when s1 is
small, which occurs in equilibrium when λ is small.
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Figure C.1: Values of θ̂ as a function of λ for 0 < λ < 1.
Figure C.2: s1 for different values of λ, with 0 < λ < 1.
C.2 Simple Asymmetric Quality Upgrade Game
Here we consider a variation of the simple quality upgrade model discussed in Section 2,
relaxing the condition that the returns to quality upgrade are the same for the two firms.
We do this by considering that each firm privately observes the realization of its own Γi,
with Γ1 and Γ2 normally distributed with mean µ, variance σ
2
Γ and correlation coefficient
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ρ. There is one important aspect that distinguishes this game from the previous example:
in the asymmetric case considered here there is no (own) market uncertainty.
Firm 2
q2 = 0 q2 = 1
Firm 1
q1 = 0 1, 1 0, Γ2
q1 = 1 Γ1, 0 Γ1 − c , Γ2 − c
Figure C.3: Quality upgrade game with asymmetric returns.
As before, we will look for equilibria in cutoff strategies. The expected payoff to Firm























Firm 1 is indifferent between investing or not if
Γ1 − c− (1− c) Φ

































The condition for uniqueness in this case requires that the slope of the best response
b1 (Γ2) is smaller than 1, i.e, the best response b1 (x2) crosses the 45












Figure C.4: Combinations of (ρ, σΓ) satisfying uniqueness condition for different values of
σΓ for the asymmetric model. Shaded area represents the uniqueness region for the case of
c = 0.25.
C.3 Simple Entry Game
Consider the following entry game:
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Firm 2
q2 = 0 q2 = 1
Firm 1
q1 = 0 0, 0 0, Γ
q1 = 1 Γ, 0 Γ− c , Γ− c
Figure C.5: Payoff matrix - simple entry game
The individual payoff is normalized to zero when the firm decides not to enter, Γ when
the firm enters alone and Γ − c when both firms enter. We interpret Γ as the monopoly
profit and c > 0 as the discount in the profit that comes from competition when both firms
upgrade their products. In the complete information game, for Γ > c, entry is a dominant
strategy for both firms. If Γ < 0, then no entry is dominant. For values of Γ between 0 and
c, there will be two pure strategy Nash equilibria and one equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Now assume that the fundamental parameter Γ is normally distributed with mean µ
and variance σ2Γ. Firms do not observe Γ directly. Instead, each firm receives a signal
xi = Γ + εi, where εi ∼ N (0, σ2ε) with ε1 and ε2 independent of each other and of Γ. The






features both fundamental uncertainty (Γ is not known) and strategic uncertainty (a firm
does not know the opponent’s action). Similarly to the game of complete information, if the
signals are precise about the realization of Γ (i.e., σ2ε is low), high signals will induce firms
to invest as a dominant strategy and low signals will lead to no investment. We consider
equilibria with cutoff strategies, in which there is a threshold x below which a firm will not
invest and above which the firm will invest.
The expected payoff to Firm 1 from not investing is zero. When investing, the expected
payoff to Firm 1 is
E [Γ|x1]− c [1− Pr (x2 ≤ x2|x1)]
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where
E [Γ|x1] = ρx1 + (1− ρ)µ
and
Pr (x2 ≤ x2|x1) = Φ






Firm 1 is indifferent between investing or not if
ρx1 + (1− ρ)µ− c+ cΦ






The slope of the best response of Firm 1 is




































. Focusing on the case of strategic substitutes, the slope of the best response








From (C.3.1) we have that in order to have strategic substitutes, ρ cannot be too close
to one. If that happens for some range of values of the signals, the slope of the best
response will be positive and b1 (.) will be a correspondence (and not a function). These
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cases are always associated to multiple equilibria. Provided that the best response b1 (.)
has a negative slope, one condition that ensures uniqueness is that it crosses the −45o line
only once. This is guaranteed if b′1 (x2) is larger than -1, which is true whenever condition
(C.3.2) is satisfied. Turns out that this condition will be satisfied more easily the closer ρ
is to 1. These two conditions together
Figure C.6: Combinations of (ρ, σΓ) satisfying uniqueness condition for different values of
σΓ. Shaded area represents the uniqueness region.
C.4 Numerical Analysis
In this appendix we study the slope and concavity of b1 (x2). Let
∆ (x1;x2) =
ˆ
δ (Γ, x2) dG (Γ|x1)
= FL (x1;σε, ρ) + FR (x1, x2;σε, ρ)
where














































































Define1 F (x1, x2;σε, ρ, r) = FL (x1, ;σε, ρ)+FR (x1, x2;σε, ρ)−r. The best response function
b1 (x2) is defined implicitly as
F (b1 (x2) , x2;σε, ρ, r) = 0.
The derivative b
′
1 (x2) is then obtained from the Implicit Function Theorem by
b
′


























































































































































1Here we are developing this section in the space (σε, ρ) instead of (σΓ, ρ) because it simplifies the
expressions.
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Results used in the proof of Proposition 6
The first numerical result showed here is that the best response b1 (x2) is strictly increasing.
We show this by evaluating b
′
1 (x2) (derived in (C.4.1)) in 100,000 different combinations
of (σΓ, ρ, x2). The Mathematica code is presented in pictures 17 and 18 alongside with the
results. We test for violations of b
′
1 (x2) > 0 and none was found in the 100,000 evaluations
tested.
The second numerical result showed here is that for r = 1/2, the best response b1 (x2) is
strictly concave when x2 > 0 and strictly convex when x2 < 0. Similarly, we show this by
evaluating b
′′
1 (x2) (derived in (C.4.2)) in 100,000 different combinations of (σΓ, ρ, x2). The
Mathematica code is presented in pictures 19 and 19 alongside with the results. We test
for violations of b
′′
1 (x2) < 0 when x2 > 0 and none was found in the 100,000 evaluations
tested.
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Figure C.7: Mathematica code for testing if the best response function is increasing (Part
1).
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Figure C.8: Mathematica code for testing if the best response function is increasing (Part
2 with results).
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Figure C.9: Mathematica code for testing concavity of the best response function (Part 1).
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Figure C.10: Mathematica code for testing concavity of the best response function (Part 2
with results).
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The next picture shows that for any σΓ > 0, b
′
1 (0) is concave in ρ and converges to 1
as ρ→ 1.
Figure C.11: Function b
′
1 (0) evaluated at different combinations of (ρ, σΓ) in orange and






















































































































We can always write max {X, a} = X × 1 (X ≥ a) + a × 1 (X ≤ a), where 1 (.) is an
indicator function. Then,




x1 (x > a) fX (x) dx+ a
ˆ +∞
−∞




xfX (x) dx+ aPr (X ≤ a)
































Hence, for the particular case of a = 0:











In the conditional case:










C.5.2 Conditional Expectation Normal Random Variable
Let Y ∼ N (µ, σ2). We want to compute E [Y |Y > τ ].
E [Y |Y > τ ] =
ˆ +∞
τ
yf (y|y > τ) dy
where












) = 1σφ (y−µσ )
Pr (Y > τ)
.
Then

















































































where Y ∈ R, X ∈ Rk and ΣXX is nonsingular. Then, conditionally on X, Y is normally
distributed
Y |X ∼ N
(
µY + ΣY XΣ
−1

















Hence, cov (x1, x2) = σ
2






















the distribution of xi conditional on xj is given by
xi|xj ∼ N
(

























the distribution of Γ conditional on xj is given by
Γ|xj ∼ N
(
ρxj + (1− ρ)µ, (1− ρ)σ2Γ
)
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C.5.4 Computation of E [max {q + Γ, 0}]









































where the last row uses (C.5.1).
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